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SUMMARY 
Rife with political intrigue, bloody revolt, and impassioned debates over the role of 
different members of society, the French Revolution continues to baffle and bemuse despite the 
ever-accumulating wealth of scholarship. From the Great Terror of 1793, historians initially 
derived the term revolutionary justice and people have since indiscriminately applied the phrase 
to the entirety of the French Revolution and other revolutions without pausing to question the 
validity of the saying.  In response, this study serves to nuance the meaning of the expression by 
proposing a theory of multiple justices and exploring its strength through three cases of lèse-
nation taking place from 1789 to 1790: Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras. 
These three people were members of the dominant ruling class known as the nobility.  
Their status as members of this particular estate subjected them to three types of justice: social, 
political, and judicial. This increased sensitivity to multiple pressures stems from their historical 
roles as noblemen.  History created an ideal standard of what a noble should be and non-nobles 
held the aristocracy to these higher standards.   
Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras were tried at the Châtelet court in Paris, France.  This 
thousand-year-old building, originally a fortress protecting the city of Paris turned royal 
courtroom in the late 12th century, gained new jurisdiction from the National Assembly to hear, 
try, and judge criminals accused of lèse-nation, and protect rights given in laws and the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, including the right to counsel, right to have access 
to incriminating evidence, and the right to a public trial.  In applying the law to the cases before 
the bench, the Châtelet had to weigh the popular and political pressures against judicial justice, 
individual rights, and state safety. 
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The first case revolves around the prince de Lambesc, a noble from a very well known 
French family—House of Guise and Lorraine—who, as a military man, led a regiment of 
cavalrymen and other soldiers.  In July of 1789, King Louis XVI called for several troops to 
come to Paris, including Lambesc.  He was then charged with the protection of trade outposts 
(barrières) and general peace in the city.  On the night of July 12th, his commander, the baron de 
Besenval, ordered Lambesc to disperse a group of protestors from the place Louis XV (now 
place de la Concorde) and then from the Tuileries gardens.  People saw his charge into the 
Tuileries as an affront to the sanctity of Paris and exaggerated rumors spread across the city 
claiming that Lambesc assassinated an old man, Chauvel.  While Lambesc fled the country to 
Austria, the Châtelet investigated the criminal behavior and eventually acquitted Lambesc 
despite public disdain. 
As for the second case, the baron de Besenval is best known for his crime of failing to 
defend the Bastille prison from public looting and eventual dismantlement on July 14th, 1789.  
When he was accused of leading a counter-revolution against Paris, he, too, attempted to flee to 
Switzerland, his homeland, but was stopped by regional militia.  Detained outside of Paris, the 
National Assembly debated over the fate of the first captured criminal of lèse-nation.  Political 
officials such as Necker pled for amnesty while newspapers led by revolutionaries such as 
Brissot called for swift and punitive justice for an enemy of the people.  Through a series of 
political maneuvers, Besenval escaped the wrath of the Parisian masses on his way to be tried by 
the Châtelet where he was subject to the lenient opinion of the judges.   
His trial would become wrapped up in a second claim of aristocratic conspiracy against 
the marquis de Favras who suffered from immediate public scorn and contempt.  Favras was 
charged for a plan to abduct the king, spur treasonous behavior among the National Guard, and 
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siege the city of Paris.  Implicated in this plan was the comte de Provence, the future Louis 
XVIII.  In a political cover-up, a judicial transaction occurred where Besenval was released 
while the people celebrated over the soon-to-occur hanging of Favras.  These cases show just 
how revolutionary justice balanced multiple political, social, and judicial aims to determine the 
most just outcome.   
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ABSTRACT 
Despite the wealth of information on the French Revolution, the courts of law remain an 
understudied subject matter, in particular the inconsistent application of criminal law in pursuit 
of suspects of lèse-nation by the Comité des recherches and Châtelet.  This study bridges this gap 
using archival research of court documents and a holistic approach to historians of the time, of 
the crime, and of the cases in question.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trials of 
the prince de Lambesc, baron de Besenval, and marquis de Favras paint a battleground of a 
multitude of conflicting justices—social, political, and judicial—resulting from the status of the 
individuals as noblemen.  The aristocracy came under extreme scrutiny due to the infamous 
aristocratic conspiracy, which thus subjected those nobles to public excoriation, political 
manipulation, and premature judicial constraint.  In defense, they turned to social appeals 
through the press or written word, political pleas for amnesty or acquittal, and judicial privileges 
and exemptions—tools of an educated, connected, noble upbringing. The analysis of these case 
studies nuances the understanding of revolutionary justice and opens the door for greater 
discussion of the role of the courts in the transfer of power and accountability of elites.   
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INTRODUCTION 
You are not thinking hard enough if you are sleeping well.  And you 
would have to be unhinged to take on a subject like the French Revolution, 
or Rembrandt, and not feel some trepidation.  There is always a possibility 
that you will crash and burn, and the whole thing will be a horrible, 
vulgar, self-indulgent mess. – Simon Schama 
 
In 1789, ten percent (10%) of the infamous Cahiers de doléances bemoaned the costly, 
prejudiced, and physically removed judicial system of the Old Regime.  While the civil court 
system certainly contributed to the notoriety, it was the perceptively unjust and inconsistent 
application of criminal law that garnered hatred by the common people and warranted the 
description of archaic and obsolete.  Considered incomprehensibly complex, the law seemed 
arbitrary and severe.  Scandals such as the cases of Calas, Chevalier de la Barre, and Montbailli, 
pocked the justice system and flamed the passions of the masses.  Socio-economic development 
during the time only aggravated the feelings of deprivation as the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment bolstered aspirations while capabilities of the average man left these expectations 
unfulfilled.  Thus, on the eve of the Revolution, the newly defined nation sought to eradicate the 
source of the frustration and misfortune and use the courts to legitimize the new regime.  With 
rumors of an aristocratic conspiracy of counter-revolution, the nobility found itself in the 
crosshairs of the purge and the events of July 12th, 13th, and 14th, 1789 only solidified this 
movement.  The initial victims of this lashing out were the prince de Lambesc and baron de 
Besenval, but the hunt would continue through December of that year and catch the marquis de 
Favras under the same net.  
The prince de Lambesc and baron de Besenval were not only members of the nobility, 
but also directly responsible for the violence experienced on these momentous days.  Lambesc, 
with his team of dragoons, were charged with the protection of the trade posts (which were prone 
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to violent looting due to a grain shortage) and with the dispersion of discontents assembled at the 
place Louis XV on the July 12th, 1789.  His commander, the baron de Besenval, ordered troops 
across the city of Paris and had a central role in the inadequate protection of the Bastille prison 
on July 14th.  The final case study concerns the marquis de Favras who, although absent from the 
initial revolutionary days of July, would become the face of the aristocratic conspiracy upon his 
arrest in late December.  The three trials would become inexorably linked in early 1790 as the 
Parisian masses exerted continued pressure to punish agents of the Old Regime and those trying 
to reinstate its existence.  
 Historians covering the trials or the surrounding circumstances are divided into three 
categories: time, crime, and case.  Historians of the time are the most well known and include 
those such as Thiers, Tocqueville, Michelet, Sorel of the 19th century and Aulard, Mathiez, 
Lefebvre, Cobban, Soboul, Furet, and Hunt of the 20th century.1 When one speaks of the 
immense oversaturation of literature about the French Revolution, one is undoubtedly talking 
about this group of historians who have seemingly covered every niche imaginable.  From the 
role of the people (e.g. Soboul and Lefebvre) to the role of politics (e.g. Cobban), Marxists and 
Revisionists combined seem to have left no stone unturned.  But, since the 1980s and the 
rejection of the classic interpretation of the French Revolution as class conflict between nobility 
and bourgeois, there is no one unified vision. Now, historians of the French Revolution follow 
the trend of specialization and elaborate on specific issues such as criminology or particular 
trials.  
Historians of crime address the neglect in the study of the courts and concern themselves 
with the system of incrimination and penal code in the Old Regime and its subsequent 
                                                
1 This is by far only a fraction of the historians concerned with the French Revolution. 
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transformation into the Napoleonic Code.  Particular to this study are the authors studying lèse-
nation—the crime for which the previously mentioned noblemen would be charged—and the 
provisional powers of the Châtelet—the court where the nobles would be tried. In this category 
are Edmond Seligman (1901), G.A. Kelly (1981), Jacqueline Lafon (2001), and Jean-Christophe 
Gaven (2016) who have conducted brilliant archival work.2  Their conversation revolves around 
lèse-nation as a precursor to the Terror or as a simple defense mechanism.  These two viewpoints 
agree that the new regime used the ambiguous criminality of lèse-nation to ensure state safety, 
but disagree as to the extent of the abuse of this power. Others, such as Barry Shapiro (1993), 
reject this pessimistic view of lèse-nation and argue that, despite the all-encompassing nature of 
the crime, practice proved to be incredibly lenient, at least in the first years of 1789 and 1790.  
Historians of crime talk about Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras in the greater context of the crime 
rather than focus down on the cases.  
The final group of historians have looked at the criminal pursuit and processing of 
Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras in particular.  As to the first, only Paul Spagnoli attacks the 
Châtelet’s investigation into “Lambesc’s Charge” and he only does so to untangle the historical 
retelling of July 12th by generalists such as Schama and Sutherland.  In his conclusion, he states 
that Lambesc’s actions “struck psychological cords that continued to resonate for years,” far 
beyond the objective significance.3  As for Besenval, I must rely on Shapiro (1993), and, to a 
lesser extent, Seligman (1901) as foundation.  Together they paint a picture of political 
manipulation, procedural frustration, and an acquittal based on furtive conversations rather than 
                                                
2 In regard to the use of the word lèse-nation, the technical translation would be treason against 
the people, or simply treason.  Many authors discussed herein translate it willingly using either 
term.  But, given the complex nature of the crime, its inconsistency in application, and the 
possibility of confounding it with lèse-majesté—treason against the king—I will leave the word 
unmodified throughout.  Translating the crime loses meaning.  
3 See Spangoli “Lambesc’s Charge” p. 493. 
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legal adjudication of the facts.  Finally, the historians covering Favras include his brother, 
Guillaume-François, Baron de Cormeré (1790), Alexis de Valon (1851), Edmond Cleray (1932), 
and Shapiro (1993).  All emphasize the cover up by the Châtelet and Comité des recherches to 
exclude the comte de Provence (future Louis XVIII) from the allegations of conspiracy.  
Shapiro, in particular, points to a judicial transaction between Besenval and Favras completely 
outside of judicial transparency, where the death of the latter permitted the release of the former.   
All of the aforementioned historians of crime speak of political manipulation, judicial 
leniency, and popular force, but have not considered these three pressures as distinct justices at 
odds with each other.  The justice spoke of in their works is unique, one-dimensional, static, and 
pertains only to the application of the law. This definition of justice is consistent with most 
criminology studies.  But, other historians focus on political and social influences, though do not 
address the goals of these influences.  I hope to show that these pressures, forces, and influences 
are in fact results of the political court and social court whose ideas of justice directly clashed 
with what would be judicial justice. The goal of political justice is to maintain stability within 
the regime and its institutions; meanwhile social justice safeguards the people against perceived 
unfairness and reacts often viscerally to external threats to societal security. Meanwhile, judicial 
justice upholds the man-made laws of society in face of change.  Revolutionary justice occurs 
when these three justices enter into conflict because of the forcible overthrow of government or 
social order.  Understanding the interplay among these multiple justices would bring coherence 
to the multiple theories of revolutionary justice ranging from punitive to permissive and bring 
light to the reasons for the internally inconsistent application of criminal procedure during the 
French Revolution.  It is my hypothesis that at the crux of this understanding is the status of the 
criminal.  Because the accused in these cases were nobles—as defined by legality and, perhaps 
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more importantly, public perception—they were subject to higher standards of care—the degree 
of prudence, caution, and responsibility associated with acts that could possibly harm others, 
such as developing economic policy or leading the people morally.  On the background of an 
aristocratic conspiracy at the turn of the Revolution, any indication of a breach of this duty was 
thoroughly investigated because it was seen as particularly offensive—even criminal. Belonging 
to the nobility became an aggravating circumstance worthy of public excoriation.  But, political 
ties to powerful elites within the old and new regimes militated against public persecution.  Thus 
the Châtelet became a battleground between what is thought to be traditionally ruthless 
revolutionary justice and the merciful mission for stability.   
Thus, this analysis seeks to answer to what extent the status of the criminal affected the 
trials of nobles during the French Revolution.  To undertake this monumental task, I have 
conducted personal research at the Archives Nationales at Pierrefitte-sur-Seine looking at files 
BB/30/82, BB/3/221, and AB/XIX/5299.4  Additionally, the digitized repository of the 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, Gallica, houses an incredible quantity of newspapers, texts, 
and historical prints. From this cornucopia of sources come four chapters and two interludes.  
The first chapter will show that the social status of the nobility rested firmly on its historical role 
as model for emulation thereby creating a high standard of care in regard to personal actions and 
governance; that the public saw the military as the heart of the nobility in 1789; and that 
“revolutionary justice” consisted of holding the agents of the old regime accountable under a 
                                                
4 For archival materials outside of the aforementioned collections, I rely on secondary sources.  
In particular, the documents concerning Besenval are scattered among multiple boxes at the 
National Archives at Pierrefitte-sur-Seine.  At the time of my trip to Paris, I was unaware of 
BB/30/161, D/XXIX/bis 1/1, 1/3, and 1/8, which contain a good many texts.  While I would 
prefer to have a first-hand textual analysis of these documents, I rely on Barry Shapiro and Jean-
Christophe Gaven who have analyzed the contents of these documents.  My particular discussion 
derives from the documents contained in BB/30/82, which contained documents on Favras, 
Besenval, Lambesc, and Danton (the last being omitted from my discussion).  
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guise of equal application of the law.  The second chapter looks at Lambesc who, although 
having escaped actual imprisonment, faced criminal charges both at the Châtelet and in the eyes 
of Parisians who declared him “an enemy of the people.”  The first interlude shows how the 
outcome of Lambesc relied on the outcome of his direct commander, the baron de Besenval, 
whose procedural nightmare is the subject of the third chapter.  The second interlude analyzes 
Barry Shapiro’s judicial transaction theory that aligns with the theory of multiple justices 
enounced in this work.  The final chapter looks at Favras, the most famous of the cases of lèse-
nation, and demonstrates that his death was inherently based on financial and political severance 
from nobility despite a clear public label of “counter-revolutionary aristocrat” (Valon 1097). 
 
Having explained the scope and methodology of this work, it should be clear that this analysis of 
Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras would contribute to the growing literature on lèse-nation and 
provide a more nuanced understanding of revolutionary justice. Taking a holistic approach to the 
multiple justices that disproportionately affected nobles during the French Revolution and their 
court cases, I plan to show how revolutionary justice is in fact a proverbial battleground between 
the old and new regimes, social orders, and laws resulting in aristocratic backlash, power 
struggles, and courtroom commotion surrounding prince de Lambesc, baron de Besenval, and 
marquis de Favras.
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CHAPTER 1—NOBILITY, CHÂTELET, AND LÈSE-NATION 
Before delving into the case studies regarding the trials of the nobility for the crime of 
lèse-nation it is essential to understand the historical context in which the nobility found 
themselves and the theoretical underpinnings of criminology during the late 1700s.  Who was 
considered among the nobility?  What functions did they serve?  How did the French Revolution 
alter the concept of nobility?  And, in analogous reasoning, who was considered among the 
criminal?  What function did the Châtelet serve in criminal proceedings?  How did the French 
Revolution alter the processing of criminals and perception of suspects?  Naturally the practice 
strays far from the theory, but understanding the major trends of leniency and punishment 
surrounding the trials will provide insight into the minds of those in charge of prosecuting the 
enemies of the people: Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras.  Exploration of the nobility, the Châtelet 
(its composition and its procedure both pre- and post-revolution), and the crime of lèse-nation 
will explain the vicissitudes of the Revolution affecting the trials and firmly establish the 
existence of heightened pressures and justices during this time period. 
EVOLUTION OF THE NOBILITY 
 
Historically, the nobility derives from the feudal system during which powerful men (and 
their families) pledged loyalty, i.e. fealty, to a stronger lord or King.  In France, this dates back to 
the ninth century with records of nobilis and titles of dux and comes among the elites Nobles had 
wealth, power, and noble blood (Bouchard 501-502).  During this time, the aristocracy remained 
a relatively closed system with only exceptional families able to rise in the rankings through 
marriage or conquest.  But, the picture of noble lineage and royal families solidified during the 
eleventh and twelfth century during which nobles began the practice of heritage; nobility became 
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a continuity to preserve (Idem. 504).  Nevertheless, use of circular reasoning by historians 
studying genealogy (arguing nobles only marry nobles or people of the same name are from the 
same family) cloud the concept of nobility to be certainly more uniform than in practice (Idem. 
504).  During the 11th century, non-nobles married into noble families and people concentrated 
power around the erection of castles thereby regionalizing nobility (Idem. 504). 
After the 12th and 13th century and the establishment of the monarchy during which the 
king could nobilify or knight those he deemed worthy of a title, the nobility never stopped 
expanding and complicating.  Daughters of aristocratic families married lowly knights in order to 
add power to resources of wealth and noble birth (Idem. 524). Or, waning noble families married 
off younger sons to daughters of rich merchants or extra daughters to rich lower-class nobles, 
known as “redorer son blason.”1  More importantly, these new nobles entered into the socio-
political web of alliances connecting across noble families, their branches, and political 
supporters.  Underlying this web was a power struggle among the competing families; the Old 
Regime was essentially a civil war among the nobility.  Only in 1789 and after did the non-noble 
population threaten to shake the stranglehold of noble domination. As military power gave way 
to economic power, people began casting doubt on the archaic system of society.  As Guy 
Chaussinand-Nogaret aptly summarized, “Money mingled ranks and spread confusion” 
(Chaussinand-Nogaret 1985, 4). 
By the 18th century, the nobility proves to be an elusive and amorphous concept with 
more exceptions to the traditional model of the medieval period and more divisions creating a 
hierarchy, even among this extreme minority. New royal nobility, who acquired title through 
                                                
1 There was a strong drive to keep noble blood pure, which often led to incestuous relationships 
by the 12th century.  That is to say, marrying outside of nobility was generally frowned upon. 
See Bouchard “The Origins of the French Nobility: a Reassessment.”   
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office2 (parlement members, magistracy, chanceries, etc.), used their financial means to siphon 
power away from the feudal nobility whose titles derived from land ownership, e.g. marquisate, 
barony, duchy.  These two groups form what is commonly accepted as the major division of the 
French nobility: nobility of the robe and nobility of the sword (Idem. 8, 49). Members of both 
classes propagated the culture of service (army, courts, and counsel), which means even military 
men could be considered nobility of the robe if their title3 came from service rather than descent.  
But, origins of nobility determined rank.  
The nobles in question in this work were complicated people.  The prince de Lambesc 
came from an assuredly old and established French family (House of Lorraine) and was 
considered a foreign prince and later peer of France.  His lineage, title, and ties to the court (as 
cousin of Marie-Antoinette) solidify his classification as a noble of the sword.  Comparatively, 
the baron de Besenval was a high-ranking courtier despite his low position in the aristocratic 
hierarchy.4  Given that Besenval was a member of the Order of Saint-Louis, which showed the 
favor of the king, he should be considered a high-ranking noble of the robe.5  Finally, the 
marquis de Favras was actually a baron whose name (Thomas de Mahy de Favras) was 
mispronounced and he never bothered to correct anyone.  His family claimed to trace its heritage 
from the 14th century but his assets floundered; despite his new economic situation, he would be 
                                                
2 Interestingly enough, office at the Châtelet granted ennoblement but only after forty years of 
service.  No one benefited from this office as the program began in 1768 and the Châtelet would 
be destroyed by 1791.   
3 Many nobles did not hold title.  Lambesc, Besenval and Favras held one if not several different 
titles.   
4 Besenval was foreign born (Switzerland) and, despite his family’s service to the king of France 
since 1707, his status as a nobleman was fairly new. 
5 Interestingly enough, Besenval’s nobility came into question post mortem when the vicomte de 
Ségur claimed to be the son of the Swiss general (see his Mémoires).  The House of Ségur is one 
of the oldest families of Normandy. But his classification does not change as Besenval simply 
had an affair with the wife of one of his close friends, Philippe Henri, marquis de Ségur. 
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considered a noble of the robe.  All three men served in the military, had personal connections to 
someone in the court, and were deemed aristocrats by the people.  While money certainly 
mattered the most within the nobility, this last characteristic of recognition held more value in 
the greater picture.  Nobles of all kinds distinguished themselves from the non-noble population 
(approximately 99.5% of the French) through the exercise of social, economic, military, and 
judicial functions and privileges (Chaussinand-Nogaret 1975, 265-278). 
FUNCTIONS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE NOBILITY: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND JUDICIAL 
 
The nobility played a particular role in the Old Regime of France, because they were 
acting as the people responsible for the well being of the country.  Of course, at this time in 
history, the well being of the country meant the well being of the crown and the king’s family; 
thus, as Chaussinand-Nogaret resumes, the nobility’s true purpose was personal service to the 
king (Idem. 266). Aristocrats were wealthy, well equipped, and educated; these traits allowed for 
great flexibility and a possibility of spending time not working in the fields unlike the common 
Frenchman at the time.  It is no wonder that the nobility soon came to be the governing forces 
under the king, acting as administrators of the king’s will and serving as the royal army in 
combat in pursuit of the crown’s interests.  The aristocracy served the king as role models for the 
common man intellectually and socially, as advisors in financial and administrative matters, as 
men of arms in times of war, and as judges in the courts.  In return, they received great social 
prerogatives such as dress, economic benefits such as tax breaks, power and command over 
commoners in the military, and special judicial privileges.  But, this unspoken contract of 
function and favors had perverse effects upon the backdrop of the aristocratic conspiracy and 
French Revolution: higher standards of care and accountability, not only before the king, but also 
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before the people.6  The Revolution criminalized the nobility’s failure to execute these functions 
in a satisfactory manner and people howled for retribution.    
Firstly, the nobility served as a social and later intellectual elite.  Since time immemorial, 
noble families served as role model to subjects of France (Reinhard 21-23). Stemming from the 
stories of courtly literature, the knight and noble became the class to imitate.  At the time of the 
Enlightenment, this same group became men of talent as culture changed to value the 
philosopher and the scientist on the same level as the warrior.  The king, as an enlightened 
ruler—or despot to some—used literary savants, masterful artists, and curious scientists to 
enhance the image of French power and increase cultural and scientific domination.  By 
centralizing culture in the hands of the king and embodying this civility in the nobility who 
claimed monopoly over genius and morality, the people were left to acculturation (Lebrun 225). 
As leaders, the nobility had an obligation not to lead the people astray as culture blurred with 
morality and philosophy.  In return, the noble class benefited from social prerogatives such as the 
freedom to wear certain fabrics (sumptuary laws) and attend the court of the king in Versailles 
(Carré 8). Of course, this image of the nobility derives from public perception rather than fact.  
As Chaussinand-Nogaret pointed out, only “perhaps 10% [of the nobility] was in touch with the 
higher cultural levels, whereas the elite of the order made up an important proportion of the 
creators and consumers of the Enlightenment” (Chaussinand-Nogaret 1985, 76-77). But the 
people invested in the ideal of living nobly and public perception created public expectations tied 
to noble status.  Thus, on the eve of the Revolution, people questioned the noble’s authority over 
culture and society because of a failure to meet those expectations.  This was particularly 
                                                
6 The king, by the divine graces, was above public accountability.  He was above fault and could 
only falter because of bad advice given by his advisors.  This transforms into a pursuit of 
ministerial responsibility at the turn of the Revolution and later, in 1793, the fall from grace of 
the king.     
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poignant during the libertine movement, which sparked communal outcry against the moral 
decadence of the nobility who authored these books; such blatant and public hedonism was 
contrary to popular expectations of how noblemen should act. These breaches came under strict 
scrutiny and during the Revolution, further criminal violations resulted in nobility being seen as 
an aggravating circumstance (Lafon 88).  
This higher level of expectation and breach of confidence also existed at the financial 
level.  The nobility, as previously mentioned, originated as the wealthy elite of the medieval 
period who were capable of equipping an army and defending claims to land.  Land was the 
source of the power but also source of the income.  By the 1700s, this claim of richness surely 
came into question as titles of nobility or just noble blood meant very little economically as 
aristocrats held positions in the top and bottom one-percent of the population (Chaussinand-
Nogaret 1985, 88-89). Financially, though the king surrounded himself with his greatest servants 
and filled the ranks of the elites with the nobility. Baron de l’Aulne (Turgot), Joseph Omer Joly 
de Fleury (of the 15th century Joly de Fleur family), vicomte de Calonne, Lomenie de Brienne (of 
the 15th century Limousin family), and the infamous minister of 100-hours, the baron de Breteuil 
all served as ministers or advisors of finance.  However, the great minister of the people, Necker 
was not noble and this perhaps explains his escape from public censure at the turn of the 
Revolution.  For their service, nobles were exempt from taxes such as the taille—a tax, 
ironically, on land. But, France, through a series of expensive wars and failed economic reform, 
began to decline financially (Soboul 117-119). Who else was to blame but the ministers and elite 
nobles responsible for the past one hundred years of mismanagement?   
Further complicating this obligation to serve was the traditional occupation of the nobility 
in the army, which carried its own standards and duties.  The nobility thought the military to be 
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the perfect aristocratic occupation because it presented a possibility to rise in the ranks through 
service to the king, and they held an unjustified belief that noble blood gave one natural talent to 
command and conquer attracted most noble houses, from the poorest to the richest (Reinhard 6). 
Once again playing on the idealized past of knights and feudalism, the nobility sought to return 
to its roots in the army.7  In fact, only the nobility could be admitted to certain military offices 
(Chaussinand-Nogaret 1975, 267).  In 1750, the king proclaimed the creation of a noblesse 
militaire or noble military.  The edict ennobled all generals (and their male heirs) and the third 
generation of military men who completed a certain time of service in the army (Reinhard 9-10). 
But some (i.e. nobles of the sword) protested the inclusion of commoners into the nobility and 
access to the Ecole Militaire; all attempts to reverse the inclusion failed due to immediate war-
time conditions until 1781 with the passage of the Ségur Ordinance, which required proof of four 
generations of nobility to serve as a sous-lieutenant or higher in the infantry (as in the cases of 
Besenval and Favras), dragoons (as in the case of Lambesc), or cavalry in the French army 
(Idem, 10-11).8  High military positions were restricted again in 1788 and reserved for the old, 
well-recognized noble families.  Of the military orders such as the Order of the Holy Spirit, 
Order of Saint Louis, and Order of Saint Michael, the first and third were entirely reserved to the 
nobility (of at least three generations) (Idem. 26-28).  High-ranking officers in the French army, 
such as Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras, could therefore easily be presumed to be noble by the 
general public.  Therefore, the reasonable standards associated with military conduct were 
stacked upon the already stringent standards set by the expectations of the nobility discussed 
supra.   
                                                
7 Service in the marine did not afford the same privileges.  See Reinhard Elite et noblesse dans la 
seconde moitié du XVIIIième siècle  
8 Or one could be the son of a recipient of the Order of Saint Louis. 
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The final function of the nobility was judicial office, which carried prerogatives, 
responsibilities, and contempt like other service-oriented positions in society filled by the 
nobility. The king was considered the fountain of justice, but, incapable of hearing every 
complaint and ruling on every matter, he chose his representatives to act in his stead in courts 
across the country.9  Offices in sovereign courts also gave nobility to its occupants (Carré 6-7). 
Magistrates of the Parlement of Paris, Courts of Accounts, and Courts of Aids of Paris gained 
access to titles of nobility after a period of service.  Conversely, much like the army, these 
offices eventually required four degrees of paternal nobility (Ibid). In short, the highest judicial 
offices were reserved for members of older nobility.  In return for the management of the judicial 
system across the French country, magistrates received several benefits including committimus—
the right to be tried by one’s peers, meaning other nobles in Parlement—, varying “lighter” 
punishments such as death by decapitation rather than hanging, etc. (Idem. 316-317).  These 
judicial privileges and seigniorial rights were at the heart of the official redress of grievances 
inaugurated by the French government in 1789 known as the Cahiers de doléances.  Concerns in 
the Cahiers de doléances included:10 
a) Modifications to Justice: abolition of exceptional courts and prerogative courts, 
destruction of state prisons (i.e. Bastille), no imprisonment without court appearance for 
more than twenty-four hours, abolition of Waters and Forests courts, privileged access to 
appeals courts (committimus) to be abolished, defending counsel to be created, simpler 
and swifter procedures, magistrates to be irremovable, courts to be brought closer to 
                                                
9 This is, of course, ignoring the seigneurial courts, which, by their name, indicate the ruling 
presence of land-owning nobles.  
10 Concerns listed here are present in at least 10% of the grievances counted by Guy 
Chaussinand-Nogaret in his book, The French nobility in the eighteenth century. There were, of 
course, other grievances besides the ones listed here and some grievances came into direct 
conflict with one another (such as the revocation or protection of the Ségur Ordinance of 1781, 
vote by head or vote by order, protection of noble privileges or equal protection before the law). 
Just barely missing the threshold of 10% were the demands of criminal prosecution to be in 
public and restriction of death penalty.   
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those under them, more parlements, civil and criminal codes to be reformed, and legal 
costs to be cut. 
b) Protections of Individual Rights: individual freedom to be inviolable and 
sacred, none to be tried except by natural judges, release on bail, no interference with 
private mails, freedom of thought and press, rights for minorities, and property to be 
inviolable. 
c) Preservation of the Nobility: honorific prerogatives to be preserved, non-nobles 
not to carry arms, Ordinance of 178111 to be revoked and possession of transmissible 
nobility to suffice for entry, seigneurial courts to be retained and improved, seigneurial 
rights to be retained, vote by order, nobles to be allowed to engage in trade and other 
non-servile professions, abolition of heredity in office, venality to be abolished and 
nobility to be the reward for service, and thought to be given to the poor nobility 
(Chaussinand-Nogaret 1985, 150-156, 159-160). 
 
As will be explained later, the judicial problems resulted in an exaggerated slowness and 
inefficiency lamentable to all parties, even the nobles running the courts.  Contrary to the 
National Assembly’s decree of August 4th-6th, 1789 abolishing the privileges of the nobility, 
some members attempted to maintain their exceptional rights in the courts in face of the 
problems they caused.  Popular opinion judged this aristocratic reaction as counter-revolutionary, 
once again placing the elite nobility upon a bed of prejudice.    
REVOLUTIONARY RIGHTS AND REFORM 
 
Given the gravity of the judicial problems exposed through the Cahiers de Doléances, the 
National Assembly had to address the call for rights and reform.  Several laws severely altered 
how criminal suspects proceeded through the judicial system, which traditionally followed the 
Ordinance of 1670 and its edits.  The first great text to modify these procedures was the 
Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen on August 26th, 1789, which promulgated the rule 
of law (Article 5), equal protection of the law (Article 6), freedom from unlawful arrest and 
                                                
11 The Ségur Ordinance of 1781 required officers in the French army to produce proof of four 
generations of nobility in order to serve.   
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imprisonment (Article 7), protection from unduly harsh or barbaric punishments (Article 8), and 
the presumption of innocence (Article 9).  
On September 10, 1789, the National Assembly created the Comité pour la réforme de la 
jurisprudence criminelle (Committee for the reform of Criminal Jurisprudence) to reinforce these 
principles by law.  The result was an immense expansion of rights in the decree of October 9th: 
right to public trial (through the usage of notables) (Articles 1-2, 21), right to know one’s accuser 
(Articles 4 and 12), freedom from unlawful arrest save for crimes punished by corporal 
punishment (Article 9), right to counsel (Articles 10, 12, 18-20), right to public adversarial 
process (Article 11), right to incriminating evidence and procedural dossier (Articles 14-15), and 
right to cross-examine witnesses (Article 16). These modifications to criminal procedure 
followed the general trend towards protection of individual rights and abolition of barbaric 
practices such as torture (Lafon 73). A second wave of judicial reform occurred on January 21, 
1790 when Joseph-Ignace Guillotin proposed that the same offences had to be punished by the 
same sentences, that punishment of a criminal could not taint the family in honor, that property 
of criminals could not be confiscated, and that the body of a criminal condemned to death had to 
be delivered to the family without mention of means of death on official documents.   
Some of these rights were more nuanced than others.  For instance, the right to counsel 
was not absolute. Counsel attended the investigation but had no right to speak or suggest 
responses to witnesses.  On the day of the final audience before the court, counsel is present 
throughout the hearing unlike the accused that entered only after the report of the judge and left 
shortly thereafter.  In absence of the accused, counsel then presents his client’s defense (Lafon 
76; Articles 18-21 of the Decree of October 9th, 1789).  Cases of lèse-nation before the Châtelet 
would test the limits of these rights and principles of individualism, particularly in the case of the 
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absconder Lambesc whose absence endangered all of these novel protections.  Denial of rights 
was grounds for nullification and attorneys such as de Sèze, Thilorier, and Cormeré fought 
valiantly for their clients before the Châtelet.   
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHÂTELET 
 
One of those archaic buildings most clearly representing the Old Regime, the Châtelet 
was a courthouse that heard all criminal and civil cases within its jurisdiction, save for royal 
cases such as, ironically, lèse-majesté (“Le Châtelet de Paris”).  There once were two fortresses 
that defended the city of Paris, the Grand Châtelet on the right bank and the Petit Châtelet on the 
left bank.  The Grand Châtelet would become part of the royal jurisdiction in 1190 under 
Philippe-Auguste.  The Paris jurisdiction was one of the most vast and covered one-third of the 
total French territory.  Initially, the Châtelet held subject matter jurisdiction over crimes against 
the public security, sedition, fraud, and breaches of corporation regulations (Ibid).  From 1190 to 
1300, there was not a right to appeal.  It was only in the 14th century that those found guilty of a 
crime could be heard before the newly created Parlement de Paris.12    
Before being brought before the court, suspects were kept in the prison cells on site.  
There were several different types of prison cells, much like the better-known Conciergerie, but 
none of the options provided any ease and some actively put the prisoner in serious discomfort 
(Ibid.).13  One could consider Paris a microcosm, separate from judicial practice in the rest of the 
country given the existence of two courts of royal jurisdiction; nevertheless, Jacqueline Lucienne 
                                                
12 The Châtelet became notorious for very harsh punishment, including death by boiling for 
counterfeiting money or to have the right ear cut off for a first time theft.  See “Le Châtelet de 
Paris” for further information. 
13 For instance, the small cell called the Chausse d’Hypocras always contained enough water to 
cover the prisoner’s feet so that the prisoner could not comfortably stand nor sit nor lay down 
(“Le Châtelet de Paris”). 
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Lafon, author of La Révolution face au système judiciare d’Ancien Régime, concludes that the 
Châtelet and Parlement are “generally reflective of other jurisdictions in France during this time 
period (15). The Petit Châtelet would be destroyed in 1782.  The cases in question took place in 
the Grand Châtelet, which heard its last cases in 1792 and was subsequently destroyed between 
1802 and 1810 because of its natural reminder of the Old Regime (“Le Châtelet de Paris”). 
However, before its destruction, members of the new regime filled the Châtelet and found new 
investigatory and judicial powers thereby transforming into a court of revolutionary justice.   
COMPOSITION OF THE CHÂTELET AND THE COMITÉ DE RECHERCHES 
 
Agents of the new and old regimes composed the Châtelet and the corresponding 
investigative body, the Comité de recherches, leading to a complex and inconsistent application 
of the law.  Presiding over the Châtelet was the lieutenant-civil who, at this time, was Antoine 
Omer Talon.14   Talon exercised high judicial functions and progressively consolidated power in 
the office as administrator of justice and the city (Lafon 30; “Le Châtelet de Paris”).  He was a 
member of the parliamentary families, a noble, and acted as a political agent under the 
commander-in-chief of the National Guard, the marquis de LaFayette.  Together with his friend 
Sémonville, who was also a judge, Talon controlled the court (Shapiro 1993, 30-31).  Appointed 
on September 30, 1789, Talon managed the 1,200employees of the court: individual lieutenants, 
councilors, crown prosecutors, examiners, lawyers, and hundreds of judges (Shapiro 1992). 15   
                                                
14 The provost of the Châtelet traditionally held power over the court but the office ceded control 
over to the lieutenant-civil in 1630 (Mousnier 316). 
15 The Ministère de justice lists 1200 people working at the Châtelet under Louis XIV.  I have 
not found evidence to suggest an increase or decrease in employees, but given the extra 
responsibility, I would wager on a higher number by 1789.  Additionally, to differentiate 
between the various forms of legal counsel, it is important to know that procureurs helped 
defendants navigate the criminal procedure while avocats actually aided in the defense.  Take for 
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Among these officials was judge and lieutenant-particulier André-Jean Boucher d’Argis, a 
French revolutionary philosopher-politician (Seligman 1901).16 
D’Argis was quite typical of Châtelet judges coming from bourgeois or recently ennobled 
origins.  He was well known for his role in the Association de Bienfaisance Judiciaire that 
provided counsel for indigent defendants and argued that in “tumultuous tribunals where reason 
does not always preside...a man who might be unjustly accused would be exposed to public 
scorn” (Shapiro 1993, 32-32).  Many men in the Châtelet shared d’Argis’ propensity for criminal 
law reform and leniency.  Most importantly, this judge who saw the accused in the light most 
favorable would be the presiding judge in the infamous case of Besenval.   
The municipal Comité des recherches, empowered17 by police and prosecutorial 
measures to “arrest, if necessary, persons who are denounced, to interrogate them, and to acquire 
and assemble the evidence necessary to make a case against them,” consisted of six people: 
Brissot de Warville, Agier, Lucretelle, Perron, Oudart, and Garran de Coulon (Shapiro 1992, 
662; Jean Sylvain et al.).  All but Lucretelle would be associated with the revolutionary Girondin 
movement in some capacity. Brissot and Garran de Coulon took charge of the committee and 
wrote most of the denunciations and conclusions of investigations.  Brissot even pursued extra-
judicial justice by commenting on the cases of lèse-nation in his paper Patriote français and 
provoking the passion of the masses (Shapiro 1992, 660). 
                                                                                                                                                       
example the counsel of Besenval: Romain de Sèze (avocat) and de Bruges (procureur). As for the 
judges, the 1789 Almanach Royal digitized by the Bibliothèque nationale de France contains a 
full list.   
16 Boucher d’Argis also contributed heavily to the encyclopedia of the time.  See Seligman La 
justice en France pendant la Révolution.   
17 The Comité des recherches took form after a decree from the National Assembly on the 23rd 
of October 1789.   
 
 
29 
On one hand, the Châtelet consisted of officials under the control of LaFayette and of the 
opinion that suspects deserved doubt and full rights; on the other hand, the Comité des 
recherches filled with revolutionaries given ample tools to punish those they deemed threats to 
the movement.  The question therefore is the following: which hand would dominate the cases of 
lèse-nation? 
LÈSE-NATION: DEFENSE MECHANISM OR POLITICAL ASSASSINATION? 
 
Through three laws, the Châtelet acquired an entirely new subject matter jurisdiction that 
nevertheless seemed like a logical extension of its duty to protect the public’s safety and try 
cases of sedition.  Less than a week after the start of the Revolution, the National Assembly 
targeted the “beholders of power who would have caused or could have caused the misfortune of 
the people,” including nobles, military, and those in power or those who counseled the king, and 
decreed that the crime of lèse-nation was to be tried by the “representatives of the nation” and 
that the Assembly would appoint the tribunal responsible for these cases in the Constitution to be 
produced (Gaven 15-16, 118).  The proclamation left little ambiguity around the goal of the new 
crime: punish enemies of the new regime (Idem. 119).  Pre-Revolutionary French “criminal law 
was always looking for a victim to sacrifice to public tranquility” (Shapiro 1993, 23).  These 
enemies and victims, Gaven counts, included four ministers, fifteen military officials, three 
princes or dukes, eight people of the church (one of which was a bishop), sixteen persons tied to 
the Court, three deputies of the Constituent Assembly and five members of municipal assemblies 
implicated in crimes against the nation between 1789 and 1790 (Gaven 296-297).  In short, lèse-
nation was a crime against the high nobility and the lowly soldier (Idem. 462).  
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The suspects of lèse-nation were to be “accused, convicted, and punished...by the 
law...and all suspects accused of these sort of crimes… judged according to the law after a public 
investigation (Idem. 118).  This new crime drew natural parallels to the old crime of lèse-
majesté, which included any actions against the king.  The transition from king to nation was one 
of the clearest signs of a greater transition of sovereignty (Lafon 132). Less clear was the actual 
substance of the crime.  No exact definition ever existed for lèse-nation. In the records remaining 
of cases of lèse-nation, the clerk rarely even inscribed the official charge (Idem. 33). Lafon, in 
her archival research, arrives at a four-class division of crimes charged as lèse-nation: 
1. Publication (most numerous) (e.g. Séguier) 
2. Inflammatory Remarks against the Decrees of the National Assembly (e.g. 
Guillard, Roussel) 
3. Disturbance of the Peace (e.g. Danton, Marat, Noël, Deschamps), usually for 
seditious or incendiary words 
4. Political plots (e.g. Astorg, Bonnaventure Antoine-Jacques Delcros, Barmont) 
(Idem. 33-34).  
 
Despite this division, there remained a serious question of how the suspects accused of lèse-
nation could be judged by the law alone given there were no legal definitions for the crime, no 
punishment suggested, and no court to try the cases.   
The final problem in this list would prove to be incredibly pertinent as militiamen outside 
of Paris arrested the first suspect of lèse-nation, Besenval, just five days after the designation of 
lèse-nation.  Fears of an aristocratic conspiracy disturbed the public tranquility and the 
provisional government of Paris risked increased rioting and violence.  Thus, the National 
Assembly would then not be able to wait until the completion of the Constitution (completed two 
years later) and they instead passed a second decree on the October 14th, 1789 giving 
extraordinary and provisional investigatory powers to the Châtelet (Gaven 119; Lafon 32). 
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Historians such as Lafon, Shapiro, and Gaven have found this assignment particularly 
differently.  Lafon shows that the Assembly at that time was incredibly concerned over the 
political nature of the Parlement de Paris and did not give much heed to the Châtelet.  For her, 
the new nature of the Châtelet was fairly unexpected (Lafon 21).  Shapiro, on the other hand, saw 
the assignment of lèse-nation cases to the Châtelet as the natural choice to enact LaFayette’s 
policy of reconciliation.  For him, placing the prosecutory powers against the Old Regime in the 
last vestige of the Old Regime guaranteed a lack of punishment of criminals (Shapiro 1993). 
Finally Gaven looks at the implications of the provisional assignment of power to the Châtelet.  
For him, it was a question of whether or not this form of revolutionary justice was to be 
temporary or a permanent18 feature of the next regime (Gaven 131). 
The Decree of October 21st, 1789 neither confirmed nor denied the nature of the crime 
but did finally give subject matter jurisdiction and full power to try the cases of lèse-nation to the 
Châtelet (Lafon 32). The earlier declaration permitted a provisional incrimination allowing the 
fledgling government to respond to complaints of ministerial dereliction and popular violence.  
As a defense mechanism, lèse-nation assured a premature juridicity and allowed a more effective 
and efficient response to ongoing threats to public security.  Although many historians have 
argued about the harshness of the Châtelet being a precursor to the better known Terror, others, 
such as Shapiro (1992; 1993), Lafon (2001), and Gaven (2016) rush to the defense of the 
institution.  Arguing for the necessity of the crime and the generally indulgent application of the 
law, the Châtelet is now seen as a precarious balancing act where incredible opportunity for 
abuse was circumvented by political pressure for reconciliation. 
                                                
18 Lafon believed that the Châtelet revealed a new revolutionary spirit: the willingness to have a 
permanent jurisdiction to judge political crimes (35).  
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
At the heart of the debate over lèse-nation and the role of the Châtelet is the application 
of criminal procedure.  It is therefore important to understand what should occur before and 
during a trial before the court.  Edmond Seligman’s outlined the procedure based on the 
Ordinance of 1670: audition of witnesses before the lieutenant-criminal, decree (of arrest, of 
personal adjournment, or of summons19), interrogation of the accused (without counsel save for 
specific crimes), règlement à l’extraordinaire which subpoenas the witnesses to be cross 
examined, written legal conclusions by the procureur du roi, and the submission of the reporter’s 
exposé to the full council who renders the final disposition (Seligman 26-28). But, this procedure 
would change during the Revolution.  Altered by the laws previously discussed, the Comité des 
recherches collects all evidence of the crime and follows the procedure outlined by Lafon: 
submission of denunciation (varied, but often by the Comité des recherches), decree of arrest and 
of adversary procedure, nomination of council in charge of investigation, and interrogation of the 
accused (before which the accused has the right to counsel, all pieces of the procedure, minutes, 
and evidence against him), cross-examination of witnesses, and final disposition (Lafon 75-76). 
The most notable difference concerns the enhanced presence of the defense throughout the trial.   
During the investigation, cases followed the procedure set forth in the Ordinance of 1670 
and the modifications of October 8th-9th, 1789 (see supra) (Idem. 34).  The lieutenant-criminal, 
Bachois de Villefort, and fifteen advisors judged the grand criminal20 cases (Idem 24). To ensure 
the new right to a public trial, notables-adjoints were appointed for each case and the public 
                                                
19 Décret de prise de corps, décret d’ajournement personnel et décret d’assigné pour être ouï.  
20 The petit criminel dealt with more minor crimes while the grand criminel heard cases that 
called for peine afflictive, including death, deportation, reclusion, and other harsh punishments. 
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could theoretically witness the investigation.21  Notables-adjoints were not consistent throughout 
the case and often intervened during the initial phase of the trial (Idem. 80-81). These notables 
came from different social origins and the supermajority did not have a legal background (Idem. 
78). Assembled together, council and notables, for four to six audiences each month, the Châtelet 
only heard a maximum of five cases each time and sometimes only one (Idem. 21). Dossiers 
became incredibly long and the process was slow, usually resulting in inhumane wait times in 
less-than-ideal prisons (Idem. 34, 79).  By the end of the investigation, judges deliberate in the 
chambre du conseil and render a judgment. Two-thirds votes were needed to inflict corporal 
punishment or exile and four-fifths for the death penalty (Lafon 85; Article 25 of the Decree of 
October 9th, 1789). This procedure continued from October 23rd, 1789 until the final hearing 
before the criminal chamber on January 20th, 1791 (Lafon 27).22  
 
In summary, the Revolution represents a direct challenge to the tradition of the Old Regime and 
new laws in response to this challenge fundamentally altered the Châtelet, which would in turn 
have an immense impact on the trials in question.  Prior to the Revolution, the nobility 
floundered to meet societal expectations that historically justified the superior position in the 
socio-economic hierarchy.  Now aware of the inherent unfairness and inequality, social justice 
sought to upend the traditional model of society.  At the same time, the political ramifications of 
this new social understanding threatened the institutions of the Old Regime and the authority of 
the political elites.  In response, political justice attempted to reinstate the authority of the Old 
                                                
21 Courtroom size often limited this right to publicity.   
22 At the closing of the Châtelet, cases were often given to the inferior courts in each 
arrondissement or to the Tribunal de Dix or the Parlement.  Crimes of lèse-nation were 
transferred to the Haute Cour Provisoire at Orléans in application of the Decree of March 5th-
13th, 1791.  For more information, cf. Lafon La Révolution Française face au système judiciaire 
d’Ancien Régime.   
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Regime.   Even the normally unified judicial justice split because of the new laws and courts 
such as the Châtelet needed to choose between the system of privileges and the equal rights 
proposed by the Revolution.  The opportunity to determine which justice would prevail would 
turn out to be the trials of lèse-nation of Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras whose status as 
noblemen brought them front and center to this battleground of ideas. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2—PRINCE DE LAMBESC: FALSE START TO THE REVOLUTION 
Today, the French populace and any professor giving a broad overview of the French 
Revolution promulgate the idea that the Revolution had two major starting points: the 
convocation of the Estates General (May 5th, 1789) and the storming of the Bastille prison (July 
14th, 1789).  While these certainly were significant events in French history, there happened to be 
a false start to the Revolution: the breach of the Tuileries (July 12th, 1789).  One professor in 
1794 went so far as to say that the Revolution commenced on  
...the forever memorable day when the criminal Lambesc, entering into the Tuileries, 
saber in hand, with a detachment of his Royal-Almand [sic] regiment, massacred with his 
own hand a respectable old man who had committed no crime except to appear in 
Lambesc’s path (Journées mémorables de la Révolution française, quoted in Spagnoli 
466), 
 
The Chronique de Paris (Issue no. 156, June 7th, 1790), among other newspapers, commented on 
how the public waited with anticipation Lambesc’s judgment at the Châtelet.  Why is it that this 
event of seemingly momentous consequence is left from the retelling of the Revolution?  Paul 
Spagnoli remarked the “scant attention from historians” and set out to settle the discrepancies 
among the “formulaic accounts of this and other events of 12 July” (Spagnoli 468). While Paul 
Spagnoli analyzes the historiography of Lambesc’s charge, others, such as Jean-Christophe 
Gaven and Denis Salas have looked at the judicial proceedings the followed. Finding the story 
yet incomplete, this section seeks to complete the record by providing more information on 
Lambesc himself, his vilification in the social court through pamphlets and pictures, his escape 
from the political court by fleeing to Austria, and the resulting experiment in the judicial court 
regarding criminal procedure. 
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WHO IS THE PRINCE DE LAMBESC? 
 
Born on the September 28th, 1751, Charles-Eugène de Lorraine, comte de Brionne, duc 
d’Elbeuf, prince de Lambesc, and future marshal and colonel of his own troupes of the Royal-
Allemand was the relative to Emperor Leopold II, of Germany, cousin to Marie-Antoinette of 
Austria, and brother to the prince de Vaudémont (with whom he would serve) (Fleury 11-18).  
His parents Louis de Lorraine, comte de Brionne and Louise-Julie Constance de Rohan could 
trace their history back to the dukes of Guise whose lineage stemmed from the great king 
Charlemagne (Idem iii, 2).  In addition to their historical ties to royalty, Charles-Eugène’s father 
also held the position of Grand Squire of France and would often accompany Louis XV on 
hunting trips (Idem. 10).  This position and intimate connection to the crown would be thrust 
upon Charles-Eugène at the age of ten because of his father’s sudden death. Initially under the 
regency of his mother, he would assume full control as Grand Squire at the age of twenty (Idem. 
26-27). Until then, his mother, for the betterment of his education, placed him under the charge 
of the marquis of Castries where he acquired a taste for military matters before traveling around 
Europe and continuing his instruction in Austria (Idem. 115-126).  
After coming of age and the passing of Louis XV, the prince de Lambesc continued to 
serve as Grand Squire and become ever more familiar with members of the royal families of 
Europe.  Living in a private abode near the Grand Stable in Versailles (at least until duty forced 
him to leave that building in May of 1789 in anticipation of the Revolution), Lambesc 
maintained close proximity to the king and the nobility that surround him (Idem. 70-73).  With a 
particular affinity for military manners, he eventually entered the king’s service, purchased his 
first regiment in 1771, and became colonel and chief of the Royal Allemand Dragoons—one of 
the most well-equipped cavalries of the old monarchy—in 1785 (Idem. 200-221). It is in 
 
 
37 
command of this regiment that Lambesc would become one of the principal military chiefs under 
the command of the baron de Besenval in charge of maintaining order in Paris during July 1789 
(Gaven 171). 
For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to say that no person was more intimately 
involved with the monarchy than the prince de Lambesc; he was the nobility incarnate.  He 
profited from the economic and political situation of the Old Regime and had much to lose if 
power were to change hands. His vast land owning permitted him an easy life and many (feudal) 
privileges (Fleury 184-186). Most importantly, he actively served as an officer of the crown as 
Grand Squire and as commander of a military regiment.   
TRESPASS IN THE TUILERIES 
 
But, this connection to the king and crown soon led to his downfall on the eve of the 
Revolution.  In May of 1789, Jacques Godechot paints a picture of Paris familiar to 
demonstrations that occurred earlier that year in Nantes (January 26th-27th), Marseilles (March 
23rd), Besançon (March 30th to April 3rd), Montlhéry (April 15th), and even in Paris itself (April 
27-28th, July 5th-9th) (Godechot xvii-1). Paris was fraught with worry as economic despair due to 
costly wars only worsened the bread crisis.  To make matters worse, the king began to call 
soldiers to arms in the city itself without first justifying his action (Idem. 179). The only foreign 
regiment called to arms to defend Paris was the Royal-Allemand.  Four hundred men left 
Landrecies on the July 29th and were to set up a provisional camp in a western suburb of Paris, 
La Muette on July 7th (Archives de la Guerre, cited in Godechot 179-180). The some 30,000 men 
already in Paris by July 4th were placed under direct orders of the Marshal de Broglie and the 
General Besenval (Idem. 180). Certain deputies of the National Assembly echoed the worries of 
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the common Parisian about the “warlike preparations of the Court” and drafted a plea for the 
immediate withdrawal of troops (Godechot 181, quoting Mirabeau). 
Louis XVI justified the troops in a letter sent on July 10th, stating, “they were only 
intended to repress, or rather to prevent fresh disturbances, to maintain law and order.” But the 
troops were not all under the control of the crown.  Some regiments, most notably the French 
Guards, proclaimed that they would rather dismantle their guns and be hung than fire upon the 
citizens of Paris (Godechot 184; Fleury 225). This may explain the reliance on foreign troops, 
who had no conflicts of interest, from the 8th to the 12th of July when Lambesc and the Royal-
Allemand cavalry were sent to the customs posts near Montmartre to protect officers from the 
Parisian masses (Godechot 182; Fleury 230).  While this letter appeared to offer comfort to 
some, the next day the citizens would have new worries. On the evening of July 11th, Necker, the 
great representative of the people, received a letter from Louis XVI announcing his dismissal and 
requesting his immediate absence from France. He left (Godechot 184-185). 
The morning next, Parisians learned of the dismissal and felt personally attacked.  This 
day being Sunday, people had the free time around to go to the Palais Royal and inquire about 
the dismissal. Certain were so bold so as to mount the soapbox and incite insurrection, the most 
famous being Camille Desmoulins (Fleury 233).  Although the actual role of Desmoulins is 
doubtful, he exemplified the misinformation that formed the basis of information for the average 
person.  When public opinion becomes the arbiter of justice, facts matter much less than public 
perception.  Moved by seditious speeches, some 3,000 peoples went to close the theatres in 
mourning.  Travelling down the Boulevard du Temple, the mob passed a wax museum owned by 
Curtius who exhibited the busts of Necker and the duc d’Orléans (Godechot 186-188). The mob 
took the busts and moved towards the place de Vendôme.  From this point on in the story of July 
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12th, it is necessary to understand that multiple versions exist and from varying points of view.  
The prince de Lambesc weaves a charming tale of visiting his mother at this time (Lambesc 4). 
Meanwhile Spagnoli, based on his reconstruction of witness testimony and other first-hand 
accounts, tells of the growing masses, now nearly six thousand, who enrolled the help of the 
Guards of Paris for protection against the Royal-Allemand regiment (Spagnoli 476, quoting 
Bailly Mémoires). Witness statements from the actual investigation that will be discussed infra 
include multiple tall tales of pillaging amongst the more reasonable stories of a parade across 
Paris (Procès du prince de Lambesc).  Nevertheless, even after a complete reconstruction of 
events, the Vendôme period remains elusive.  Either a squadron of dragoons fought and killed at 
least one member of the Guard of Paris protecting the demonstrators (Schama, Buchez, Michelet, 
Flammeront), the dragoons were overrun (Godechot), or nothing happened (Spagnoli 472). 
From the place de Vendôme, the masses then move to the place Louis XV (current place 
de la Concorde) at approximately 7:00 PM.  Their actual destination was unclear but some 
testimony points to a march on Versailles, such as the one that occurred on the 4th and 6th of 
October later that year (Idem. 475).  It is also unknown whether or not another scuffle occurred 
at the place Louis XV.  What is clear is that the baron de Besenval requested assistance from 
Lambesc’s regiment; that Lambesc himself led the group of soldiers in corralling the masses into 
the Tuileries gardens; that Besenval—present at the place Louis XV—then ordered Lambesc to 
disperse the crowd from the Tuileries; that Lambesc ordered his troops to approach the crowd 
across the Pont Tournant (a rope bridge over the moat surrounding the Tuileries at this time); that 
the troops were pelted with various rocks and other items; that feeling unable to complete the 
task at hand, Lambesc ordered a retreat and ordered pistols to be shot in the air; and that 
Lambesc did strike one man, Jean-Louis Chauvel, who threatened to close the gate of the 
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Tuileries and trap the soldiers (Spagnoli; Lambesc; BB/30/82; BB/3/221). This is what is now 
known as “Lambesc’s Charge.”  
RUINING THE REPUTATION OF THE ASSASSIN OF OLD MEN 
 
The Parisian masses felt betrayed that a soldier of the royal army would dare enter the 
Tuileries—the heart of Paris and a garden of peace—, on horseback and armed, scaring away 
defenseless citizens out for a stroll on a Sunday evening.  Rumors began to circulate around Paris 
about the assassin Lambesc, killer of old men, presumably in reference to Chauvel who was 
falsely presumed to be dead after Lambesc’s blow to the head.  Parisian society castigated 
Lambesc and desired take away what Garran de Coulon—member of the Comité de 
recherches—called “a good a thousand more times more precious than life: an honorable 
memory” (Gaven 174, quoting Garran de Coulon). Shapiro argues that Coulon’s next victim 
would be the baron de Besenval, but the people and the press certainly fixated on ruining this 
honorable memory of Lambesc (Shapiro 1993, 58). 
People spreading the rumor of the massacre at the Tuileries used the growing paranoia of 
an aristocratic counterrevolution led by the troops stationed in Paris to lend credence to the tale, 
which transformed the charge into a violent attack aimed at the citizens of the city.1  Artists 
immediately began work on depicting the heartless actions of the prince de Lambesc and 
chronicles such as Revolutions de Paris printed the engravings for all to see.  Given the rate of 
literacy at the period (around half of men and a quarter of women) pictorial depictions of 
Lambesc’s acts would be far more effective in promulgating the “massacre” myth than lengthy 
pamphlets and newspapers and would effectively serve as the public’s first impression of the 
                                                
1 Anti-royalists used similar tactics and propaganda nine years earlier in describing the March 5th 
Boston “Massacre” in the United States.  
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July 12th event (Melton 82). Seven of these images survive (printed from 1789 to 1799) today 
and each tells a slightly different story. Both the representations of Lambesc’s actions and the 
captions that accompanied the pictures paint the prince in a dastardly light and flamed the 
passion of whoever happened upon the image despite multiple discrepancies among the prints.  
Many of the images overemphasize Lambesc’s role in the charge and show him 
exhibiting personal violence far beyond what first-hand accounts have relayed.  Two pictures of 
anonymous origin show Lambesc chasing after a man, saber raised high above his head ready to 
strike (Action Barbare; Assassinat Commit par le Prince de Lambesc).  The authors likely 
confused Lambesc with the captain de Reinach who served Lambesc and testified that, at the 
time of the charge, he chased off a man who had assaulted him with rocks (AN BB/3/221, 
Deuxième Information). Three engravings picture the prince at the head of a large group of men 
firing upon the crown as Lambesc tramples or sabers the people in his way, suggesting that 
Lambesc ordered the merciless attack on the Tuileries passerbys (Evènement du 12 juillet 1789; 
Janinent; Thévenin).  While shots were indeed fired at the end of the charge, soldiers shot into 
the air only to scare back the crowd away from the Pont Tournant. Furthermore, the illustrations 
do not accurately portray who Lambesc actually sabered; while he admitted to attacking 
Chauvel, a man, some show him striking a woman or even multiple people at once.  Even the 
most accurate image, drawn by Jean-François Janinet, shows a cowering old man defenseless 
against the powerful Lambesc.  In Chauvel was personified Paris and in Lambesc, the nobility, 
the military, and the aristocratic conspiracy.  Even in Charles Thévenin’s illustration where the 
crowd throws chairs and rocks in defense, the power discrepancy between the soldiers and the 
masses is overtly emphasized.  
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Capitalizing on the already unsympathetic light cast upon Lambesc through the imagery, 
certain illustrators titled the event in a way that certainly inflamed the passions of the reader.  
While Jean-François Janinet and Charles Thévenin remain relatively neutral in their descriptions 
(Event of July 12th, 1789: the prince de Lambesc at the head of a detachment of the Royal-
Allemand enters the Tuileries by the Pont Tournant and sabers an old man and Lambesc’s 
Charge respectively), others deem the breach of the Tuileries a “barbarous action,” and decry the 
“assassination committed by the prince de Lambesc;” Laurent Guyot went so far as to say, “the 
Tuileries are sullied by the odious presence of the prince de Lambesc whom, blinded by fury, 
dares to strike a respectable and debilitated old woman with his scimitar: this low deed2 was the 
first sign of the dire conspiracies against the nation” (Action Barbare; Assassinat Commit par le 
Prince Lambesc; Guyot).  Clearly, the authors depicting the events of July 12th, 1789 were on the 
side of the defenseless people rather than the prince. The message of a violent emissary of the 
crown striking down an old man mattered more than factual accuracy and each illustration 
further tarnished the social image and reputation of Lambesc while painting the average Parisian 
as the victim of such a difference in power between the noble military and the masses.   
The only image nuancing this power disparity comes from Antoine Louis François 
Sergent who actually illustrated the violence at the customs posts that took place after Lambesc’s 
Charge.  In that image, the French Guards defend against the Royal-Allemand’s assault on the 
people.  This confrontation between the military orders occurred after a civilian by the name of 
André Riel died from shots fired by the Royal-Allemand in defense of the Blanche customs post 
(Sergent).  While the courts would consider this episode outside the scope of the investigation 
                                                
2 It is of note that Guyot used the term lacheté, which also means cowardice, for which Lambesc 
became known. 
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(infra),3 Sergent’s illustration and the rumors that likely accompanied it certainly contributed to 
the public vilification of Lambesc and the Royal-Allemand regiment.    
All in all, the pictures blacken Lambesc’s reputation by depicting him as a heinous 
individual and assassin of defenseless Parisians.  The subtitles embellish, exaggerate, or 
completely err in their narration of the event to better provoke the anger of the readers.  
Circulating from 1789 to 1799, the engravings continued to spur hostility and deprive the prince 
of an honorable memory.  Lambesc, for his part, would not stay to see his reputation tarnished; 
shortly after the storming of the Bastille, he sought sanctuary in the more politically stable 
Austria and traveled there under the protection of his regiment (Shapiro 51). 
COWARD, DESERTER, AND TRAITOR  
 
While Lambesc was seeking a better political situation and general safe haven from the 
masses looking to lynch the people responsible for the turmoil of July 1789, his flight only 
aggravated the social court’s campaign against him.  The engravings mainly focused on the 
supposed murder of Chauvel and Lambesc’s charge into the Tuileries gardens; during the 
investigation by the Comité de recherches, anger festered and transformed into multiple 
pamphlets denouncing, above all, the prince’s cowardice in fleeing from Paris.   
At the outset of the campaign against the military officials protecting Paris in the summer 
of 1789, Lambesc, Besenval, Broglie, and others were accused of being conjurés—conspirators 
or traitors—and formal lists circulated throughout the city of Paris.  People were stopped, 
detained, arrested, molested, and even killed.  The Constituent Assembly received endless tips 
about these conspirators but it was more often the municipal militias that participated in what 
                                                
3 This confrontation will be discussed in more detail under Witness Statements: Judicial 
Evidence. 
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Shapiro named the chasse aux bêtes—hunting season (55-58).  In fact, the Constituent Assembly 
received just as many complaints about the municipal militias or the general public taking justice 
into its own hands (Gaven 109). Fear and paranoia led many people to hide from the bloodthirsty 
Parisian masses.  This was but a refrain from early June of 1789 when lists of anti-patriotic 
peoples spread throughout Paris.  It should be understood that the hunting of conspirators by the 
general people conflated the social and political courts into one body.  Conspiracy is a crime 
inherently against the stability of the political order, yet the executors of this justice had to be the 
people because of the nature of the regime and the redefinition of nation at the turn of the 
Revolution.  For perceived political threats came social castigation, and desertion was seen as an 
admission of guilt thereby justifying the chastisement. 
For example, in the pamphlet Chasse aux bêtes puantes et féroces, the author contends 
that particular animals have escaped the forests and entered the capital.  Two-hundred livres 
were promised to the person that could find, dead or alive, the “very savage hedgehog, who, after 
having long exhausted the troops of the Champ de Mars, appeared in the capital, especially at the 
Pont Tournant, then at the Tuileries, then once at Versailles before disappearing entirely.”  If the 
wording was not clear, the anonymous pamphleteer makes a point to include a footnote saying 
that the hedgehog—most likely because of the prince’s cowardice in retreating from the Tuileries 
and then from Paris—refers to Lambesc and his carnage (La Chasse aux bêtes 8). The pamphlet 
goes on propose killing the venomous and disease-ridden beasts that might be found at 
Versailles, Bagatelle, la Muette, Hôtel Condé, etc., in reference to the soldiers (Idem. 11, Article 
XVIII). Of course, the author would also like more than to call to arms against Lambesc.  The 
same text goes on to say that the punishment for the savagery of the prince is: “to be shot by the 
soldiers of the French Guard and his body brought in triumph to the Tuileries, place Louis XV, 
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and the streets of Paris before being dropped at the morgue where one ordinarily puts thieves4 
and assassins after their torture” (Idem. 14).5  His brother, prince de Vaudémont, was 
“sentenced” to twenty years in the cells of Bicêtre (Idem. 29).6  The wording alone shows the 
hatred expressed towards Lambesc and is worth note as violent imagery and emphasis on 
savagery, barbarity, and cowardice are repeated again and again. Of course, the hunters were not 
successful in capturing Lambesc who had the protection of his regiment to flee the country 
(Shapiro 1993, 57).  In fact, nearly the entire Artois faction to which Lambesc belonged eluded 
the hunters and became the first émigrés.7 
Perhaps in response to an unfruitful hunting season, even more pamphlets and short 
stories were published, all chastising the prince de Lambesc for his failure to take responsibility 
for his actions and remain in Paris.  Certain use Lambesc’s flight as the premise for a moral 
fable.  In Lambesc’s Descent to Hell, the prince supposedly escapes to Turin, Italy before going 
to visit Mt. Etna (Descente du Prince Lambesc aux enfers 3-4).  The author depicts Lambesc as 
courageous enough to arrive at the summit of the mountain but cowardly enough to nearly turn 
back (Idem. 3-4).  At the summit, an old man asks why he is about to flee from the mountain and 
says that he should not be afraid, unless he has taken arms against his fellow men.  Together, 
descends into the mountain which is a gateway to Hell only to be greeted by Louis XII, Henri IV, 
                                                
4 It is unclear what the author meant in calling Lambesc a thief as none of the allegations against 
him mentioned such crime.  Though, it is not rare to see such multiplication of derogatory names 
in pamphlets mentioning Lambesc or other land-owning nobles.   
5 The word used for torture is supplice which has a particular connotation absent from the 
English translation.  It could also mean ordeal.   
6 For those curious, the author of the pamphlet rejected the clemency of the National Assembly 
towards Besenval and instead favored the will of the people, which was to have Besenval’s head 
cut off as punishment for his zeal when writing to the Governor of the Bastille (whose head was 
cut off on the July 14th). 
7 Among the list, Shapiro includes the comte d’Artois, Broglie, Breteuil, Lambesc, and Polignac, 
as well as the comte de Vaudreuil, prince de Hénin, prince de Condé, marquis d’Autichamp, 
prince de Conti, Barentin, Villedeuil, and abbé Vermont. 
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the Cardinal Georges d’Amboise, Maximilien de Béthune, and Turenne8 in the Elysian fields 
who gasp in astonishment at the arrival of a “traitor to the homeland” so close to the land 
reserved for “the just and virtuous, the good kings, and those who have served humanity” (Idem. 
6). Walking past, Lambesc then stands before Pluto who denounces the prince’s temerity and 
shows the torture he is to receive once dead.  Ushered by servants, Lambesc is led to the lands 
destined for traitors where he find Flesselles, Launay, Foulon, and Berthier9 suffering 
unimaginable torture with furies clawing at their feet and a serpent coiled around each person’s 
head (Idem. 11).  Using a story people were likely to be familiar with in 1789, the author warns 
what awaits those who dare to commit treason.  
 In a similar fashion, the author of Nero-Like Lambesc Still Living?: Still Alive or the 
Response of a Savoyard to Sir Calais uses Lambesc to advocate for press reform.  In this second 
text, Lambesc is likened to Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudian emperors known for his tyranny 
and insanity (Néron Lambesc vit-il toujours? 1).  The Savoyard—the only name attached to the 
pamphlet—responds to Sir Calais—a person unknown—who claimed sometime after the 
Revolution that Lambesc was found dead.  In his response, he claims that the declaration of 
death was false and that Lambesc resides in the German state of Treves (now Trier, Germany) 
(which was true) (Idem. 5). Using this discovery, the Savoyard argues for press reform to protect 
the people from a possible return of the traitor Lambesc and other criminals now abroad.  
                                                
8 While Louis XII and Henri IV need no explanation, Georges d’Amboise (1460-1510) was a 
French Roman Catholic cardinal that served Charles VII and Louis XI, Maximilien de Béthune 
or the duc de Sully (1560-1641) was the right-hand-man to Henri IV in terms of administration, 
and Turenne (1611-1675) was former Marshal General of France who fought in many important 
wars.  
9 All of these men were accused of lèse-nation or royalist sympathies by the masses. For 
instance, Flesselles was the last provost of the merchants of Paris.  When the Revolution broke 
out, he was accused of siding against the people.  A crowd surrounded Flesselles, shot him dead, 
decapitated him, and paraded around Paris with his head on a pike, along with the head of 
Launay, defender of the Bastille.   
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Published in 1790, this text is exemplary in showing how the people and press used Lambesc’s 
mythology to advance particular platforms in the name of the nation.   
While the first two texts caution against treason and the return of the traitor, The Hanover 
Pavilion and the Hotel of Richelieu, or the General Quarter of Monsters and Executioners of 
France seeks to posit an alternative to the myth by blaming the church for the misgivings of 
Lambesc. The author claims to “complement the conspiracy [and]...the heinous crimes of 
Maréchal Broglie...and all claims against the prince de Lambesc and the barons Basteuil and 
Besenval” (Le Pavillon d’Hanovre 2). Arguing that the clergy were behind many of the 
conspiracies during the French Revolution, the author attempts to absolve the king, the princes, 
and nobles of blood of their crime.  Traitors (within the clergy) seduced the aristocracy against 
the people.  As to the “hot-headed Lambesc,” the author says that women, who naturally listened 
to the priests of the court, seduced him and, like Thersites, convinced him to cowardly join a 
conspiracy that was not his (Idem. 7).10  After shifting blame to both the church and women, the 
author goes on to further defend Lambesc in regard to his so-called accomplices, Broglie, 
Besenval, Vaudreuil, Châtelet, and Choiseuil.  These men, argues the anonymous author, blame 
Lambesc’s reckless behavior for the chaos; but the author retorts that the “French owe their 
happiness and their salvation” to the prince’s recklessness (Ibid).  None of the other sources—
graphic or literary—dare to forgive Lambesc for his actions, much less assert that Lambesc acted 
in accordance with the will of the French people.  
                                                
10 In the Iliad, Thersites is one of the Greek soldiers under the command of Agamemnon.  He is 
known to be deformed and ugly.  He recklessly attacks Agamemnon’s behavior and boldly tells 
the soldiers to leave with the ships and fight no more in such a vain conflict. Given the richness 
of the texts and the multiple references to Greek mythology, these four texts mentioned would be 
better addressed for their own literary worth by someone with expertise in that area.  
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It is difficult to reconcile this final text with other depictions of the prince de Lambesc.  
While the text does follow the pattern of emphasizing the prince’s paradoxical cowardice and 
temerity, the message of an anti-clerical conspiracy takes precedence over Lambesc’s alleged 
aristocratic conspiracy.  Nevertheless, all of the texts and images discuss show a robust 
conversation around the events of July 12th, 1789 and the subsequent flight of the prince de 
Lambesc.  Insulting, derogatory, and defamatory, the pamphlets and short stories contribute to 
the prince’s social degradation instigated by the initial engravings.  Lambesc became a common 
enough tale to be appropriated for other uses such as in The Hanover Pavilion and the Hotel of 
Richelieu, or the General Quarter of Monsters and Executioners of France.  It is clear that 
immense social pressure existed to find and punish Lambesc.  But, the general populace would 
have to rely on the Comité de recherches and Châtelet to find him judicially guilty to legitimize 
the revenge.   
INVESTIGATION IN ABSENTIA  
 
During the month of July 1789, the courts were too preoccupied with the ongoing 
disorder that Lambesc went more or less unnoticed—at least judicially.11  It was not until 
October that blamed shifted from the people to the royalty and its ministers who were technically 
responsible for maintaining order and safety of Parisian citizens (Gaven 169). The crime of Lèse-
nation can be seen as a transitional crime that would become ministerial responsibility under the 
soon-to-be Penal Code of Napoleon (Gaven 179). Gaven argues that denouncing the crimes of 
                                                
11 It should be noted that the alleged crimes committed by Lambesc preceded the creation of 
“lèse-nation.”  As explained in Chapter 1, lèse-majesté was converted to lèse-nation on July 14th, 
1789.  A general principle of non-retroactivity governed French law at the time, but it appears 
this was an exception. For a more in depth analysis of the use of lèse-nation, see Jean-Christophe 
Gaven’s Le crime de lèse-nation: histoire d’une invention juridique et politique.  
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the ministers, the public appeared generally favorable toward the king who is the victim of such 
unfaithfulness (174).  It may seem hypocritical to mark the French Revolution judicially in the 
trial of Lambesc at the same time favoring Louis XVI, but one must remember that the initial 
movement had no intention of deposing the king and abolishing the monarchy.  Certainly, new 
nobility rose to power between 1789 and 1790 and deposed the land-owning nobles of blood 
(like Lambesc!) from their throne, but the king remained above all.  
The Commune of Paris denounced Lambesc two weeks after the Châtelet was given 
provisional jurisdiction over claims of lèse-nation: October 30th, 1789 (Decree of October 14th, 
1789; AN BB/30/82; Gaven 477). But, as Montesquieu once put it: “For a government to 
degenerate into despotism, it is enough that the crime of lèse-majesté be vaguely defined” 
(Shapiro 1993, 5, quoting De l’esprit des lois Book XII). The preliminary denunciation filed by 
the General Assembly of Representatives of the Commune and signed by the procureur-syndic 
showed early signs of national despotism (Gaven 386). Directed to the procureur du roi, the 
denunciation asked for an investigation into the violence of Lambesc’s troops and his regiments 
during the month of July 1789 and specifically what has been previously detailed as Lambesc’s 
charge on July 12th (AN BB/30/82; Gaven 169-170, 386). Although one may claim that the 
investigation represented a defense of the reborn nation, that would be to ignore the often-
personal element in the case of Lambesc (and as will be seen, Besenval) whose denunciation was 
“no more than injurious rhetoric” (Gaven 179).  
The preliminary denunciation began the more secretive part of the investigation.  The 
information led to the questioning of over fifty witnesses.  Judicial proceedings were done in 
accordance to the 1670 penal code and the revisions of October, which required adjoint 
magistrates for maintaining an air of publicity (Idem. 409). On October 21st, the National 
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Assembly gave full adjudicatory powers and jurisdiction over crimes of lèse-nation to the 
Châtelet.  But, the criminal chamber of this court was had not been in session since the 8th and 
would only return to session on the October 23rd (in preparation for the judicial reforms of 
October 8th and 9th) (Lafon 25). This is but one explanation for the general slowness exhibited by 
the Châtelet throughout this case.  The newspapers and public lamented the snail-paced 
proceedings of the criminal chamber in particular (Lafon 27). Additionally, the denunciation 
against Besenval was formally submitted and even included the charge of “the violence 
committed by the prince de Lambesc against the Parisian citizens” (Gaven 173; AN BB/30/161). 
This cause of action intimately linked the fate of the two cases, causing further delay with further 
investigation.  Even the Report Committee of the National Assembly critiqued the work of the 
Châtelet and the slow nature of the investigation into Lambesc in early 1790 (Gaven 334).  
Lambesc was finally formally charged by the procureur du roi on November 24th, 1789 
(Gaven 443; AN BB/3/221). According to the law of the November 3rd, 1789, this charge 
inaugurated a public phase and requests the formal presence of the accused (Gaven 439). 
Confusion of interpretation of this law led to varying levels of application in each case.  In 
particular, Lambesc’s case was special: the accused had fled the country!  So confused were the 
magistrates of the French tribunals that the National Assembly voted a new law on the April 25th, 
1790 that contained provisions clarifying the procedure in criminal cases (Idem. 440). Article 11 
states:  
As soon as the accused is housed as prisoner, or responds to the summons to be heard or 
of personal adjournment, all of the investigatory acts must be done in his presence, 
publicly, with the doors of the court open and the presence of the adjoints will cease.12   
                                                
12 Aussitôt que l’accusé sera constitué prisonnier, ou se sera présenté sur les décrets d’assigné 
pour être ouï, ou d’ajournement personnel, tous les actes de l’instruction seront faits 
contradictoirement avec lui, publiquement, et les portes de la chambre d’instruction étant 
ouvertes: dès ce moment la présence des adjoints cessera. 
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The article was to be read so that the public phase of the trial begins when the accused appears 
before the court instead of when a judge gives the decret de prise de corps—the formal 
accusation and arrest for investigation (Ibid). But this clarification was nevertheless still silent on 
those absent and in contempt of court (Idem. 442). A plain reading suggests that even 
representation of an accused in contempt was insufficient to begin the public phase; there had to 
be the accused him or herself in court during the proceedings.  Tribunals bombarded Tronchet, 
the current Garde des Sceaux, with questions to on what to do about absent criminals during the 
public phase of the trial.  The judges of the Châtelet, in accordance with the will of the Garde des 
Sceaux, ruled that the absence of the accused is as if the accused waived the rights he was 
guaranteed, including the mandatory presence of the accused himself (Idem. 443). Thus, the two 
hearings of thirty-six witnesses between the December 2nd, 1789 and June 28th, 1790 went on 
under the semi-secret conditions and not full publicity as required by the November 3rd text 
(Ibid.). While the Châtelet generally had high respect for the law, the second hearing and 
investigation run under secret circumstances and even without adjoint magistrates in June 1790 
is a rare exception (Gaven 433; AN BB/3/221).  
Using the same logic in regard to contempt of court, Lambesc was denied any 
representation in court.  The Garde des Sceaux disapproved of awarding contempt of court with 
representation:  
To give counsel to an accused in contempt of court would be to give a clear advantage 
over he who obeys the law!  Those in contempt, from the depths that hide him, would 
take advantage of the prerogatives reserved to accuseds present by the presence of his 
counsel and without running the same risks...therefore only the accused in attendance is 
accorded the right to counsel by the law (Gaven 459, quoting a report by Tronchet). 
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Proposed on the 24th of December 1789, this decree became a reality in the law of April 25th, 
1790: “No counsel shall be afforded to those absent or in contempt of court” (Quoted in Gaven 
459). Granted, the Châtelet did not wait for this declaration and already agreed to try Lambesc in 
absentia and without counsel.  It is speculation as to whether or not his absence of counsel 
mattered.  The presence of defense attorneys was already irregular in most cases before the 
Châtelet.  As one will see in the case of Besenval, his attorney, de Sèze, was not mentioned in 
nearly any of the minutes; instead, de Bruges, prosecutor of the Châtelet, helped him (Gaven 
459-460). But, despite a general trend in judicial reform for leniency and by-the-book procedure, 
Lambesc’s case already stands out.  He was not present at the public hearings against him; he did 
not have counsel to represent his defense; and the court continued to investigate in semi-secret 
conditions despite recent amendments to criminal procedure.  In the end, the point was to mark 
the social Revolution and address the social pressures in the judicial branch, even with many of 
the people tried already dead or fled.  “The trials of Besenval and Lambesc are the trials of the 
Old Regime, or at least of its last efforts at existence,” argued Gaven (175).  The Comité de 
recherches and the Châtelet needed to mark the turn of an era but, as the evidence would show, 
Lambesc’s case was not fit for declare the Old Regime guilty of the violence of May and July 
1789. 
WITNESS STATEMENTS: JUDICIAL EVIDENCE  
 
Gaven emphasizes the incredible variety of witnesses in both the Lambesc and Besenval 
cases: “deputies, magistrates, chiefs and officers of royal troupes and national guards, supply 
officers (commissaires des guerres), civil servants of the executive body, members of the 
Parisian municipality or Provost General of the Maréchaussée of Travel and Hunting as well as 
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innkeepers, hairdressers, manual laborers, café owners and other domestic servants publicly 
testified to the events of May, June, and July 1789 (Idem 171).  Spagnoli shared this sentiment is 
his incredible recollection of Lambesc’s charge but qualified that the supermajority of witnesses 
were upper bourgeois citizens, namely lawyers and nobles of the robe (491).  
These eighty-five people saw what happened on the evening of the July 12th, 1789 and 
constitute a key insight into the investigation of the case.  Spagnoli found the depositions in the 
Archives Nationales BB/3/221 and from the piecemeal recreated a comprehensive understanding.  
In summary of his work, one gathers that Lambesc was told by Besenval and the Maréchal de 
Broglie to avoid bloodshed.  When the baron de Besenval, who was present at the place Louis 
XV during the upheaval around 6:00 PM, realized the necessity of additional troops, he sent for 
Lambesc and his Royal Allemand (or Lambesc arrived without call) (Idem. 476-478). Around 
8:00 PM, Besenval ordered Lambesc to clear the square and push the crowd into the Tuileries.  
Lambesc ordered his men to push the crowd slowly into the gardens or cause them to disperse.  
(Most civilian witnesses called the “slow push” a “charge,” (Idem. 479).) Once inside the 
Tuileries, the civilians bombarded the Royal-Allemand with stones and other objects.  Unable to 
maintain his position in the Tuileries and disperse the crowd, Lambesc ordered a retreat and for 
pistols to be fired in the air in intimidation.  An old man, Jean-Louis Chauvel, attempted to close 
the Pont Tournant and blocked Lambesc’s path; Lambesc promptly struck Chauvel on the head 
with the flat of his blade to remove him from the path yet Chauvel lived (Spagnoli 480-481; 
Lambesc 4-5; AN BB/3/221). 
Several other witnesses were present at the barrière Blanche where other members of the 
Royal Allemand kept order.  Around 8:00 PM on the same day, an angry crowd began throwing 
stones and other objects at the Royal-Allemand.  The troops fired and killed a man by the name 
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of André Riel.  The Châtelet dismissed this testimony as irrelevant to Lambesc’s Charge and 
there was no further investigation into the matter (Spagnoli 489). Naturally this was very 
fortunate for Lambesc and showed great leniency from the judges of the Châtelet.  Had the court 
wished to convict Lambesc for his crimes, they certainly had the evidence to do so.  Instead, the 
prince published his own version of the July 12th, 1789 from his residence in Treves (now Trier, 
Germany) on May 1st, 1790. He alleged no misconduct on his part or on the part of his troops, 
save for the non-fatal sabering of Jean-Louis Chauvel (Lambesc 7).  On June 28th, 1790, the 
court began a second round of depositions and witness statements including the deposition of 
Captain de Reinach who corroborated Lambesc’s extra-judicial testimony (AN BB/3/221). Two 
days later and nearly one year after the crime took place, the Châtelet acquitted Lambesc of all 
charges.  
Why he was let go remains more or less a mystery.  As will be more thoroughly explored 
in Interlude 1, Lambesc’s case was intimately tied to that of his superior, the baron de Besenval, 
and some historians argue that Besenval’s acquittal resulted in Lambesc’s case being dropped.  
Resources currently do not allow a definitive answer to this theory.  But, considering the 
existence of the political and social courts, the decision to not pursue makes sense.  As to the 
first, Lambesc represented no threat to the stability of the provisional government led by 
LaFayette, hiding as he was in Austria.  While he did constitute a major danger in 1792 as 
commander of an Austrian regiment intent on restoring the king, the Châtelet could not foresee 
this additional act of treason.  As for the social court, there still existed a serious call from 
society to punish the wrongdoers of July 1789. By this court, Lambesc was not only deprived of 
an honorable memory, but also effectively exiled from his home in Versailles.  Even if the 
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Comité de recherches and Châtelet failed to exert punitive justice, Lambesc did not go 
unpunished.   
POST-REVOLUTION LAMBESC 
 
Lambesc was reviled in France.  He became the enemy of the People.  To make matters 
worse, Lambesc, under his German name of Karl Eugen Prinz von Lothringen-Lambesc, entered 
the service of the Austrians in 1791 and waged war against the French periodically between 1792 
and 1814 (Smith).  Ebert (n.d) claims that Lambesc, during the War of the Second Coalition, did 
not fight France but in fact was fighting the Revolution.13  During this time, the prince had 
continued success commanding different squadrons against French forces between 1791 and 
1808.  When Napoleon finally fell in 1814 and Louis XVIII gained the throne, Lambesc regained 
his title of duc d’Elbeuf.  Additionally, Louis XVIII declared Lambesc a Peer of France (for the 
restoration of the king) and Marshal.   
Despite these new titles, the popular myth exaggerated and distorted over three decades 
barred any hopes of entering France. The hatred first provoked by his trip to the Tuileries 
magnified and festered over time.  The greatest testament to the hatred was a satirical last 
testament of Lambesc written by an anonymous author in 1790.  The so-called Preliminary 
Testament to the Planned Execution of the Traitor and Assassin, the prince de Lambesc: Credo 
of Traitors, or the Profession of Faith of this Criminal and Other Aristocrats, and their Mea 
Culpa14 calls the hero of Pont Tournant a traitor, assassin, and “monster abhorred by the nation” 
                                                
13 I would like to thank my colleague Grant Silverman for helping with the German translation.  
14 It should be immediately noted that there is no possibility that Lambesc wrote this text, despite 
the allegations contained in the text.  Besides the incredulous negative rhetoric of Lambesc 
throughout the text, e.g. traitor and assassin, the booklet was allegedly printed “in one of the 
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who exceeded the atrocities of “Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, Zenon, and Mezentius” in the 
misgovernment of Anjou, and in committing theft, pillaging, corruption, and other heinous acts 
unnoticed (Testament préalable 1, 4, 5). Among those crimes were the following: joining the 
aristocratic conspiracy, serving a barbarous queen in the hope of compensation, soaking in 
French blood and “lighting, through his perfidy, the fire that was bound to devour the most 
beautiful of cities,” poisoning the already soiled soul of the comte d’Artois through messages of 
fratricide and regicide, and seducing his men to commit treason against the country (Idem. 17-
19). According to the author, crime filled Lambesc’s life and would lead to his downfall. As a 
result, his French life died on July 12th, 1789.  Lambesc was forced to remain in Austria for the 
remainder of his life and died as the last of the Elbeuf branch of the Lorraine family in Vienna on 
November 21st, 1825 (Smith).  
But, Lambesc’s mythology continued to be of interest to historians through the modern 
and contemporary age.  Yet, as Spagnoli noted,  “despite its ostensible importance, Lambesc’s 
charge has received scant attention from historians” (467). Dwarfed by the taking of the Bastille 
(Besenval) and more infamous cases of lèse-nation (Favras), Lambesc’s charge becomes a 
cursory event, unimportant and relatively unexplored.  Furthermore, the circumstances 
surrounding the investigation into Lambesc, including the court investigation and admonishment 
by the people, does not provide a strong, coherent, and cohesive narrative. Historians, as 
Spagnoli points out, still disagree on key events of July 12th, 1789 (Idem. 470-471).  For 
instance, while historians acknowledge the existence of Camille Desmoulins and countless other 
provocative speakers during the month of July, people cannot agree to the extent of the effect of 
                                                                                                                                                       
holding cells of the Hotel de la Force,” in 1789.  Knowing that Lambesc was far from Paris as 
early as July 17th, 1789, one must reject all claims of verisimilitude and credibility.   
Unable to tell the motives behind the author, one cannot rule out the possibility of the text being 
complete satire given the fantastical elements contained throughout.  
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those speeches (Ibid). Other discrepancies within the story, such as the Vendôme period, became 
evident in the discussion of the witness statements that, when looked in their totality, provide 
serious problems to developing a cohesive narrative that does not derail the traditional discussion 
of the French Revolution to dwell in the details. This, in part, explains why the accepted story at 
the time of the incident, that Lambesc charged defenseless men, women, and children peacefully 
strolling in the Tuileries, assassinated a poor old man by the name of Jean-Louis Chauvel 
(despite the man living and offering a deposition at the time of the investigation), and ordered his 
troops to kill an anonymous French guard, survived for so long without much discussion (Idem. 
483-485).  
 
Across the story of the prince de Lambesc, the social and judicial courts appear intertwined.  
While the judicial courts, in the application of new laws and protection of new rights advanced 
leniency and forgiveness, the Châtelet and Comité de recherches were nevertheless spurred on by 
serious social vilification of Lambesc.  Even if the Châtelet did not find him guilty, society 
decided unanimously to punish the man who dared to carry out legitimate military orders under 
the Old Regime.  His status as a nobleman and his ties to Marie-Antoinette ensured that charges 
were brought against the prince de Lambesc but the social pressure resulting from his status was 
not sufficient to convict the absconder in face of overwhelming evidence and testimony of 
restraint (Idem. 488, quoting Relevé d’erreurs graves, consignés dans différents journaux, 
comme faits réels No. 3.). Truly, Lambesc represented the monarchy as a member of the military 
who should never have penetrated the Tuileries Gardens that belonged to the civilian population.  
Because of this error, social justice effectively exiled the prince to Austria, even after the 
collapse of the regime while judicial justice acquitted him on the charge of lèse-nation.  Or, was 
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it because of furtive political conversations within the Comité de recherches and Châtelet that 
concluded with the release of Lambesc because of the acquittal of Besenval?  
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INTERLUDE 1—LINKING LAMBESC AND BESENVAL: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
It is difficult to determine exactly how connected the investigation into the baron de 
Besenval was to the investigation of the prince de Lambesc.  After all, Lambesc was tried both 
individually for the “confrontations of the Spring of 1789,” and as a sub-cause of action in 
Besenval’s formal denunciation as, “the violence committed by the Prince of Lambesc against 
the Parisian citizens” (Gaven 173; AN BB/30/82; AN BB/30/161). The witnesses for both 
investigations overlapped and historians have treated the two trials as one and the same.1  Gaven 
considers that the cases of Lambesc and Besenval represented one trial of the Old Regime “or at 
least its last efforts of existence,” marking the Revolution judicially (170). 
Current understanding of the event suggests a primitive application of the legal theory of 
command responsibility.  The theory, a variation on the common law doctrine of respondeat 
superior meaning “let the master answer,” insinuates that the Châtelet investigated the baron de 
Besenval, in part, as a person potentially responsible for the criminal conduct of his subordinate.  
In essence, the court wished to remove Lambesc’s opportunity to plea a defense of superior 
orders—what would become known in 1945 as the Nuremburg defense.  Lawful orders were, 
after all, binding on an officer and Lambesc adhered to them with great care (consider the care in 
avoiding bloodshed when dispersing the crowd at the Tuileries). Gaven in advocating for this 
interpretation points to Besenval’s interrogation during which he had to respond to accusations 
of mismanagement of Lambesc and his troops and his subsequent December 2nd deposition in the 
matter of Lambesc’s trial saying that “he could only repeat what he had already said in his 
personal interrogation” (Procès du Prince Lambesc 94). His theory certainly seems to hold for 
the beginning of the trial. 
                                                
1 Gaven, Le crime de lèse-nation, 170 
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Upon closer inspection of the two trials, the timeline of investigation brings this 
interpretation into question.  The figure below contains a side-by-side comparison of the major 
dates for the investigation. 
 Prince de Lambesc 
 
Baron de Besenval 
 
Crime July 12th, 1789 May to July 15th, 1789 
Official 
Denunciation October 30
th, 1789 November 18th, 1789 
Arrest 
Warrant 
November 10th, 
1789 July 28
th, 17892 
Interrogation N/A November 21st, 1789 
Witness 
Statements 
November 3rd, 1789 
to June 28th, 1790 
November 21st, 1789 to 
January 28, 1790  
Final 
Judgment June 30
th, 1790 March 1st, 17903 
 
If the baron de Besenval was found not guilty of all crimes, including the violence committed by 
the prince de Lambesc, why did the magistrates continue to question fifteen additional witnesses 
in Lambesc’s investigation?  Gaven tries to justify this discrepancy by arguing that the exile of 
the prince de Lambesc caused the delay between Besenval’s acquittal on March 1st and the 
Prince’s acquittal in June (Gaven 177). Because of the elusive nature of intent, the eventual 
acquittal, and the infuriating lack of transparency in the judgment process, this theory cannot be 
confirmed or denied.   It is my personal theory that the court, in continuing the investigation 
beyond Besenval’s acquittal still had doubts about Lambesc’s conduct.  After hearing several 
depositions in Besenval’s hearings about the prince de Lambesc, including both incriminating 
and exculpatory evidence, the magistrates questioned if the accused did not exceed the scope of 
                                                
2 See Chapter 3 and Interlude 2 for a complete explanation that nuances this date.  This date 
represents his actual arrest 
3 See Chapter 3 and Interlude 2 for a complete explanation that nuances this date.  This date 
represents the final judgment rather than the findings that there was insufficient cause for a 
formal arrest warrant to be decreed on January 29th, 1790. 
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the orders given by his commander. Although the theory of command responsibility links the 
two cases, it does not permit the current accepted simplification that Besenval’s acquittal 
guaranteed Lambesc’s acquittal.  More research should occur to answer this question, as current 
resources do not permit a final saying in the matter.
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CHAPTER 3—BARON DE BESENVAL: POLITICAL SCAPEGOAT OF THE REVOLUTION 
The next case stems from the unequivocally most important event in French history: the 
storming of the Bastille prison on July 14th, 1789.  As tensions rose and food shortages led to 
riots in the streets of Paris and deaths of bakers and government officials, the baron de Besenval 
tried to maintain the peace.  Had it not been for a particular letter to the marquis de Launay, 
governor of the Bastille prison, perhaps Besenval would have been forgotten by the people and 
by historians.  However, when the provisional government read Besenval’s order to “hold on 
until the last extremity” to the French people and the people demanded his head.  With so much 
attention given to the actual storming of the Bastille, historians often neglect the court case that 
followed (though certainly not to the extent of Lambesc’s trial).  Others, such as Gaven (2016) 
and Shapiro (1993), have rectified this error and provided ample study of Besenval’s trial, 
stressing the unbelievable nature of the verdict: the man responsible for what is considered the 
true start to the French Revolution was found completely innocent.  This section serves to 
explore how a high-ranking courtier and friend to Marie-Antoinette managed to escape the 
clutches of the bloodthirsty Parisian masses with a little help from two attorneys, several 
politicians, and the Châtelet itself.  Furthermore, it will be shown that while the political court 
served as Besenval’s ticket to acquittal, competent pleas to society by his judicial defense 
ensured that the Swiss general could live the remained of his life unmolested, unlike Lambesc.   
Besenval did not suffer the same injury to his memory as Lambesc and much can be attributed to 
the trial. 
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WHO IS THE BARON DE BESENVAL? 
 
Pierre-Victor, baron de Besenval de Brünstatt,1 was born in 1721 in Solothurn, 
Switzerland to Jean-Victor de Besenval, colonel of the Swiss guards in service of the French 
king. At the age of ten, he entered the military company led by his father and began his long 
ascent of military ranks (Besenval 1821, xiv-xv). His mother, conversely, was relative to Marie 
Leszczynska, the wife to Louis XV.  This relationship granted the young Besenval access to the 
court of Louis XV and his service under the duc d’Orléans in the Seven Years War and the 
comte d’Artois in 1775 gained him audience with king Louis XVI.  He quickly became a 
companion to none other than Marie Antoinette and was considered a “high-ranking courtier” in 
the last days of the Old Regime (Besenval 1821, iv-ix; Shapiro 1993, 138). 
Besenval’s memoires recount a long and illustrious military career as “lieutenant-general 
of the armies of the king under Louis XV and Louis XVI, Grand Cross of the Order of Saint 
Louis, governor of Haguenau, commander-in-chief of the provinces of the interior, and 
lieutenant-colonel of the regiment of Swiss Guards” (Besenval 1805, i). Louis XVI granted 
Besenval command over the forces of the interior—all those stationed in Ile de France (except 
the city of Paris), Soissonnais, Berry, Bourbonnais, Orléanais, Touraine and Maine—in 1782 
(Idem. 381-382). The number of troops in these regions swelled as scarcity of grain led to 
increased violence, especially in the city of Paris, which provoked the provisional use of the 
French Guard (led by the duc du Châtelet) and Swiss Guard (led by the comte d’Affry) to secure 
transport of grain in and out of the city (Idem. 384). Due to the sickness of the comte d’Affry and 
                                                
1 Brünstatt is located in the disputed Alsace-Lorraine territory near the border between 
Switzerland, Germany, and France.   
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incompetence of the duc du Châtelet2, Besenval was effectively the commander of unified troops 
in Paris from May to July of 1789 (Gaven 171).  
As the French Revolution began with storming of the Bastille on July 14th, 1789, new 
elites within the revolutionary government searched for the perpetrators of the violence.  While 
several people were in charge of the troops who should have guaranteed the peace within Paris, 
Besenval was the first man captured by the courts.  His trial was long and his detainment longer.  
The nearly seventy-year-old general’s health began to fail at the conclusion of his trial and a 
charlatan doctor prescribed him “truffles, ham, and meat pies” for his ailment (Besenval 1821, 
xxviii). He would die on June 2nd, 1791, but he would die innocent of any wrongdoing according 
to both the court and the people (Ibid).3  
BESENVAL’S FOLLIES: JULY 1789 
 
Having already recounted the paranoia and palpable tension experienced by the city of 
Paris in July of 1789, the atmosphere did not improve after Lambesc’s charge and the scuffles at 
the customs posts on the twelfth of the month.  Suspicion arose as more and more troops entered 
Paris, especially foreign troops, nearing 30,000 strong towards the end of June (Gaven 101).  
Besenval was in charge of this small army because he was a friend to the comte d’Artois and 
Marie Antoinette and because of his years of service to the French crown (Shapiro 1993, 36). 
Rumors of disloyalty and defection among the French Guards reached the ears of the king and 
                                                
2 While the Châtelet held Besenval responsible for the violence of July 1789, it was the duc du 
Châtelet and his mismanagement of the French Guards that more likely led to the revolutionary 
state of Paris. He only recently acquired control over the regiment and immediately inaugurated 
a period of harsh training, thereby alienating the troops against the higher military order. 
3 There is some confusion as to the actual date of death of the baron de Besenval.  A 
bibliography printed prior to the baron’s official Mémoires listed his date of death as June 27th, 
1794 at the age of 72.  I find no reason to doubt the supposed son of Besenval, the comte de 
Ségur, who printed the Besenval’s Mémoires around 1805 and listed his death as June 2nd, 1791. 
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the duc de Broglie was put in command of troops in Ile de France, directly over the baron de 
Besenval and duc du Châtelet (Besenval 1805, 395-398). Besenval was told to avoid bloodshed 
at all costs, effectively stymying his ability to perform his duty adequately. To make matters 
worse, the deputies interpreted the military presence as preparation for a coup against the 
National Assembly4 and paranoia spread amongst the 600,0005 citizens of Paris (Gaven 101; 
Besenval 1805, 398). Besenval was at an impasse.  If he were to engage the troops stationed 
across the city, a civil war would break out; if he were to let the riots continue, Paris would fall 
to pillagers and brigands.   
On the 13th, Besenval received a demand from two revolutionaries for the 32,000 rifles 
and other arms kept at the Invalides, supposedly for self-defense.  Understanding that the 
weapons would certainly be used against his troops, he refused.  Later that evening he wrote to 
the duc de Broglie for orders in regard to the arms; there was no response (Besenval 1805, 410-
414).  He ordered the dismantling of the weapons but sympathetic guards made slow work and 
only managed to render twenty guns unusable in six hours (Godechot 215).  On the morning of 
the 14th, pillagers ransacked the Invalides, and the guards stood by or even helped relieve the 
building of its weapons.  Asking for orders, Besenval wrote to de Broglie, but revolutionaries 
intercepted his courier.  Gathering generals in the immediate area, Besenval learned of mass 
military defections across Paris and the loss of the Bastille (Godechot 214-237; Besenval 1805, 
417).  
                                                
4 Remember that the National Assembly sat at Versailles and not in Paris at this time.  Had the 
troops remained in Paris, perhaps the deputies would not be so worried.  Besenval attributed the 
movement of troops from Paris to Versailles to the duc de Broglie and disapproved of this 
decision. 
5 Besenval estimated the population of Paris at 800,000. 
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Historians of the French Revolution see the storming of the Bastille as emblematic for the 
fall of the Old Regime.  This fortress-turned-prison housed those unfortunate enough to receive a 
lettre de cachet from the king, including conspirators, heretics, prisoners of war, forgers, writers, 
and those charged with offenses investigated by the Châtelet (Godechot 91-94).  The average 
French civilian detested the decrepit building because of the rumored torture and indefinite 
imprisonment that occurred there.  As symbol of all the abuses under the Old Regime, they 
longed to see it decommissioned and torn down (Idem. 96-98).  For the purposes of this study, 
Barry Shapiro eloquently summarized the importance of this event: 
And for the student of political justice, July 14, whatever other significance it may or 
may not have had, marks the day on which the identity of those who feared being 
punished and those responsible for doing the punishing abruptly switched, the day on 
which the leaders of the National Assembly were converted from potential victims of 
royal justice into the final arbiters of what would be thought of as ‘Revolutionary Justice’ 
(Shapiro 1993, 44).  
 
The tides turned in favor of the Revolutionaries and Besenval retreated to Versailles to tell king 
Louis XVI6 of the fate of Paris.  Within a week, the only people standing by the king’s side at 
Versailles were the minister of foreign affairs, comte de Montmorin, and Besenval (Besenval 
1805, 420).  
It is not known why Besenval stayed at Versailles for such a long time. Some officials, 
such as de Broglie and Lambesc, left as early as the 16th, meanwhile Besenval stayed, or was left, 
at Versailles. According to the memoires of Besenval, threats of the commander’s imminent 
arrest reached the king’s ears, and he ordered Besenval to leave the country (Idem. 419-421). 
Shapiro argues the events of July 12th, 13th, and 14th so discredited Besenval that the king and 
                                                
6 Besenval’s claim of telling Louis XVI about the fall of the Bastille and Invalides is likely 
exaggerated.  Godechot reports that the National Assembly sent a representative to inform the 
king of the Parisian insurrection.  He interprets Besenval’s Mémoires to mean that the baron told 
the king about the defections in the army, a serious detail likely omitted from the Assembly’s 
report for lack of knowledge (Godechot 250-251).   
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other military officials left him to the will of the people. Royalist writers deemed his military 
failures as criminal negligence (Shapiro 1993, 59). In one story, revolutionaries hold Besenval 
personally responsible for opposition to the Revolution; in the other, royalists see Besenval as 
the enemy who lost Paris to Parisians.  While both could be true, Besenval’s memoirs attest to 
friends who also remained in Versailles and in Paris.  The commander likely wished to remain 
among his associates instead of traveling the 300 miles to the Swiss border on horseback at the 
age of sixty-eight.  Even the two-day, seventy-five to ninety-mile journey from Versailles to 
Villegruis (or Villenauxe, depending on which document one trusts) proved to be taxing for 
Besenval, two cavalrymen, and his hunting whip (Besenval 1805, 420-423). Whatever his 
motivations for a late departure, Besenval took flight to escape threats of his arrest and 
assassination, setting on the road for Switzerland. 
BESENVAL THE ROADRUNNER AND PROCEDURAL CHAOS 
 
As early as July 15th, the National Assembly declared, “the ministers and civil and 
military agents of the government are responsible for all actions contrary to the rights of the 
Nation and to the decrees of this Assembly” (Shapiro 1993, 44).  In July and August of 1789, the 
people and the press combined in their efforts to identify enemies to be neutralized (Gaven 108). 
The civilians and militiamen involved in this hunting season missed Lambesc7 but continued to 
search for other military dignitaries and members of the court (Shapiro 1993, 55-58). During the 
so-called hunt for aristocrats and evidence of the July Conspiracy, the provisional government 
began a short-lived program reading intercepted letters from Versailles to Paris.  As mentioned 
earlier, one such letter signed by the baron de Besenval asked the governor of the Bastille, de 
                                                
7 See “Myth and Lasting Influence” under Chapter 3 for more in-depth discussion of this 
phenomenon. 
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Launay, to continue defending “until the last extremity.”  Besenval’s letter to the governor of the 
Bastille fed the people’s worry of a counter-revolutionary movement from the likes of the 
soldiers still stationed around Paris and channeled their concentrated anger towards Besenval.  
This letter only provided mere suspicions of a July conspiracy and did not warrant a formal 
judicial accusation of lèse-nation based on the decree of June 23rd, 1789, but outside of the courts 
(and outside of Paris), people relished at the opportunity to serve justice upon a man who so 
steadfastly opposed the revolution (Gaven 103). 
Sometime on or before July 28th, 1789,8 Besenval reached Villegruis.  During his visit, 
the company stayed at a hostel where Besenval worked on mapping the remaining journey.  It 
was then that Besenval made two errors.  First, he spread out an immense map of France and 
conspicuously looked between his location and the Swiss border; secondly, Besenval carelessly 
asked, “if it were possible to travel without passing through the city of Villenauxe,” where 
militia were likely to recognize him (Besenval 1805, 422). His inquiry ensured his immediate 
detainment in that very hostel under suspicion of being “a fugitive aristocrat” (Idem. 423). 
Upon learning of Besenval’s capture, the Comité Provisoire de Police sent a small 
contingent to escort Besenval to Paris, who arrived in Villegruis on July 30th.  It is important to 
note that the administrative agency kept no record of this act in fear that word would get out and 
Besenval would become another victim of the Parisian masses (Shapiro 1993, 61). Therefore, 
rather than dying to an all but assured lynching, Besenval “became the property of society...the 
object of a continual process of inspection, observation, training and correction (Shapiro 1993, 
xxi, quoting Foucault). Since the end of July, Besenval was considered a “prisoner of the nation” 
                                                
8 It is unclear when Besenval actually left Paris.  His Mémoires confirm that he spent two days 
on the road before arriving in Villegruis and notice of his arrest did not reach Paris until the 28th.  
Therefore, he either left later than the 19th—the last dated entry in his Mémoires—or spent days 
in Villegruis unnoticed, or both.   
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(Gaven 170). In complete secrecy and under the cover of night, Besenval and his guards left 
Villegruis at 9:00 PM in route to Paris and into the hands of the very people that threatened 
Besenval’s life just days before (Besenval 1805, 423-424).  
FIRST INTERVENTION: NECKER 
 
Necker, who returned from Switzerland, learned of Besenval’s arrest and petitioned the 
people of Villenauxe to release the old general.  His request refused, Necker arrived in Paris on 
July 30th and pled for Besenval’s amnesty directly to the representatives present at the Hôtel de 
Ville.  He argued that Besenval had not yet been charged with any crime, nor was there any 
decree to suggest an investigation into his actions, and therefore, he was illegally detained and 
should be set free (Shapiro 1993, 63; Gaven 446). Necker also offered a second and alternative 
argument in favor of interrogating Besenval outside of Paris.  Necker’s plea for amnesty was 
temporarily granted. His heartfelt emotional appeal for reconciliation and peace moved the 
representatives to send five men (including two representatives themselves) to release Besenval 
and escort him to the Swiss border (Shapiro 1993, 67).  The general amnesty that followed the 
pardon for Besenval defined the enemies of the nation as “only those who would disturb the 
public tranquility without need” (Gaven 271, quoting AN C 28, dossier 225).  
But, on the same day, public outcry led to a revocation of all amnesty.   A 
misunderstanding of the decree led to the interpretation that the National Assembly actually 
pardoned the revolutionaries (the entire city of Paris), who could not believe that the Assembly 
would dare think that they committed any crime for which they needed a pardon.  Thus, in the 
wake of renewed anger, two more commissioners raced to stop the two originally sent to release 
and escort Besenval.  That night, the Assembly decreed the confinement of Besenval “in the 
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closest town to the place where he will have been arrested”—Brie-Comte-Robert—and that he 
“is under the safeguard of the Law” (Shapiro 1993, 70, 81; Besenval 1805, 425). The arrest of 
the Baron of Besenval ensured that the crimes of July would not go unpunished and gave ample 
reason to fulfill the promise of a lèse-nation tribunal and a committee to investigate the 
denunciations (Gaven 119). 
The baron would spend the next three months in Brie-Comte-Robert, about twenty-five 
miles outside of Paris proper. Lodged in the remnants of an old fortress that once protected the 
city, Besenval became prisoner of this inhospitable castle (Prieur, Bertault, and Duplessi-Bertaux 
1802; Besenval 1805, 425). Save the presence of a revolutionary fanatic by the name of Bourdon 
who constantly pestered the old general for a confession of a conspiracy, Besenval’s stay in Brie-
Comte-Robert was not all too disagreeable (Besenval 1805, 426-430). He read; he played 
backgammon; and he enjoyed the company of his guards, corresponding with people such as the 
duc de Luynes, duc de Liancourt, and even the marquis de LaFayette via letters (Ibid). 
On September 3rd, Besenval was once again ordered to return to Paris to be tried by the 
newly composed Châtelet, but this order was ignored.  On October 24th, LaFayette ordered the 
immediate transfer of Besenval to the Châtelet prison.  On November 6th, Besenval arrived in 
Paris.  On November 18th, he was formally denounced by the Paris Comité des Recherches.  
While Besenval became formally acquainted with his new home at the Châtelet prison, trial 
began on November 21st (Shapiro 1993, 79-83). Besenval and his counsel were immediately 
swept into the public investigation by the Châtelet and Comité des recherches (Gaven 446).  
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CHARGE AND EVIDENCE AGAINST BESENVAL 
 
Besenval was tried together with the old Garde des Sceaux Barentin (fired July 15th, 1789 
and replaced by Cicé), comte de Puységur, the War Minister until the July 11th, 1789, the duc de 
Broglie (prince du Saint Empire and maréchal de France), and the marquis d’Autichamp (Idem. 
171).  Besenval was the only person taken prisoner. Their formal criminal charge reunited all of 
the novel revolutionary institutions and political actors: “National Assembly, bourgeois militias, 
representatives and electors of Paris, Comité de recherches of the Assembly and that of the 
Parisian municipality, and procureur-syndic of Paris” (Idem. 172). Each person and institution 
played a role in forming the case against the military officials. Together, they formally 
denounced a  
conspiracy formed against the National Assembly and the city of Paris during the month 
of May until the 15th of July...the gathering of a frightening number of primarily foreign 
troops, considerable artillery, bombs, mortars, and machines to heat cannonballs9, and the 
position of these war paraphernalia between Versailles and Paris...the attack on the 
freedom of the National Assembly on the 20th of July and the days following, the 
interception of correspondence between Versailles and Paris,10 the hoarding of foodstuffs 
and grain for the benefit of the troops, the violence against the Parisian citizens 
committed by the prince de Lambesc, the threat of use of the Bastille’s cannons against 
the people for defense of this fortress until the last extremity, the unfaithful promises to 
arm the citizens and the guilty and willing inaction of Besenval in face of the multiple 
scenes of disorder multiplied by brigands and fire-starting rioters in the suburbs (AN 
BB/30/161, quoted by Gaven, 173, emphasis added; AN BB/30/82). 
 
More succinctly put, Besenval was accused of lèse-nation.  A plain reading of the complaint 
showed that Besenval represents a judicial confirmation of the French Revolution as the breadth 
of the complaint included any and all violence committed during the initial riots (Gaven 170). 
                                                
9 Grils à chauffer les boulets 
10 Not only was Besenval not responsible for any missing letters, he actually fell victim to the 
very practice. 
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The trial of Besenval (and Favras for that matter) demonstrated the turn from mere 
“revolutionary suspicion and mistrust,” as Jean-Christophe Gaven said, “into judicial 
experience” (15).  
The official articles of accusation against Besenval charge him primarily with “the 
assembling of troops, coups de force, and military intimidation” (Idem. 201).  The charge of 
conspiracy held little water compared to the quite evident mismanagement of military matters, 
evidenced by was the burning city of Paris.  However, was the baron de Besenval so extremely 
negligent in his duties that the damages caused by his troops could have been caused by his 
ineptitude and general inability to maintain order and control? And, did Besenval’s inaction 
amount to treason against the people?  
The Châtelet certainly intended to find the answer to these questions in the coming 
months.  De Sèze and de Bruges11, attorneys for Besenval, lamented and complained of the slow 
and meticulous process that involved “seven months of detention, three months of judicial 
proceedings, twenty one audiences before the Châtelet, and one-hundred and twenty-five 
witnesses, the most of which unhelpful” (Idem. 412).12  The composition of the witnesses was 
similar to Lambesc ranging from artisans to lawyers and nobles of the robe (Idem. 170).  In his 
personal interrogation on November 21st, 1789, he denied any knowledge of a July Conspiracy 
and answered questions about the chain of command of troops in Paris consistent with what has 
heretofore been described.  His longest answer pertained to orders given to prince de Lambesc, 
which only confirms the intimate connection between the two trials.  Finally, he offered letters 
                                                
11 De Sèze, already a renowned attorney, focused on Besenval’s defense while de Bruges 
navigated the complex criminal procedure surrounding the trial.  De Sèze would go on to defend 
Louis XVI in 1791, albeit unsuccessfully.   
12 Out of the numerous witnesses already interrogated by December 12th, 1789, Loustalot, in 
Révolutions de Paris, (issue no. 23, page 54) remarked that only four people had essential 
information.  
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between himself and his co-defendants to corroborate his testimony (AN BB/30/82, 
Interrogatoire M. Besenval). 
SECOND INTERVENTION: BRISSOT, GARRAN DE COULON, AND JOURNALISTS 
 
During this long and laborious investigation into the crimes allegedly committed by 
Besenval and his co-defendants, the people did not relinquish their anger towards Besenval.  The 
renewed vigor to convict the man who stood for the Old Regime came primarily from the press, 
which represents the written expression of the people at this time.  The leading journalist in this 
endeavor was none other than Jacques Pierre Brissot, member of the Comité de Recherches and 
writer of the Patriote Français.  As it has already been mentioned, between July 13th and July 
15th, several of Besenval’s intercepted letters were read publicly, including letters assuring 
reinforcements for the bastille (Shapiro 1993, 49).  Besenval sent to de Launay, Governor of the 
Bastille, the following order: “M. de Launay will defend himself until the last extremity; I have 
provided him with sufficient forces” (Idem. 41).  Brissot intercepted this message and published 
it in his paper, the Patriote français.  Furthermore, Brissot recognized supposed evidence of a 
July Conspiracy in the August 1st, 1789 edition of his newspaper but argued that judgment is 
necessary by a lèse-nation court.  Judgment, he argued, brings closure while movements for 
amnesty result in rash reactions from the public (Shapiro 1993, 75, quoting Brissot).  Brissot set 
forth two conditions for the soon-to-be lèse-nation court:  
(1) It must be constructed in such a way as to obtain the confidence of the People, who 
demand vengeance; and (2) it must be constructed in such a way that accuser and accused 
will each have an equal chance (Idem. 76).  
 
This inclination for justice naturally stemmed from his role as member of the Comité des 
recherches, but justice to the staunch revolutionary appeared to mean exhausting every possible 
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means to convict Besenval.  By August 5th, Brissot declared Besenval a monster responsible for 
anti-revolutionary conspiracies and thought (Ibid).  And Besenval, for his part, made sure to 
single out Brissot13 in his memoirs and thank the lawyers for their zeal: 
The persecution of the Comité des recherches proved to be consistent; and if I was not to 
be hanged, I owe justice to say that the four to five magistrates that made up the 
committee certainly saw to this result with ardor (Besenval 1805, 432-434).  
 
Besenval’s tongue-in-cheek commentary on the committee’s rigorous investigation portrays 
feelings of annoyance and unfairness.  To the Swiss general, the Comité de recherches did all in 
their might to find him guilty; he only barely escaped their clutches.  More importantly, this 
quote exemplifies the discrepancy between the lenient judges of the Châtelet and the fanatical 
Comité de recherches.     
Other journalists also began to cover the proceedings of the Châtelet in regard to 
Besenval and his co-defendants.  Take for example the newspaper Révolutions de Paris written 
by Elysée Loustalot and later Antoine Tournon.  Their first edition covered the storming of the 
Bastille, which already set the scene and tone of the revolutionary paper. The fourth edition 
covered his arrest in Brie-Comte-Robert and asserted, “there existed a great crime of lèse-nation” 
(2).  Then, in issues after November 21st, Loustalot covered the interrogation, depositions, 
hearings, and several writings (Issues No. 21-23, 25-30, 33, and 34).  It should be noted that the 
amount of text written about Besenval multiplied after the capture of Favras and quickly died 
down after the execution of Favras.14   For example, the 26th edition of Révolutions de Paris 
                                                
13 In addition to Brissot whose name was not censured in any way, Besenval also alludes to 
Pierre Louis Agier, Garran de Coulon, and Nicolas Oudart.  
14 Besenval’s trial profited from a generally relaxed atmosphere whose tranquility was shattered 
by the arrest of the marquis de Favras.  Gorsas, author of periodical Courrier de Versailles à 
Paris et de Paris a Versailles, began writing daily coverage on Besenval’s trial from that day 
forward. When the masses stormed the court to see the traitor Favras, other cases such as the one 
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featured a page by page critique of de Sèze’s Observations pour le baron de Bezenval in which 
Loustalot became so enraged by the audacious claims and denials of de Sèze that he daringly 
suggested deposing King Louis XVI on the matter (Issue No. 25, 1-18).  This arm of the public 
sphere continued to exert pressure on the Châtelet during the French Revolution and more often 
than not urged for punitive justice.15  Members of the press—among others—sought vengeance 
for the violence of July and wished to use the Châtelet as veritable means of committing 
assassinations of character and literally.  One such person was in the power to do so. 
Another member of the Comité des recherches, Garran de Coulon, showed particular 
interest in the fate of Besenval.  Having already been tied to the lynching of Flesselles on July 
14th, 1789, Gustave Bord argues that Garran de Coulon’s next assignment would be the judicial 
assassination of Besenval:  
At each event, [Coulon] launches the word or phrase which compromises the man in the 
hot seat...Garran de Coulon was certainly partly responsible for the assassinations of the 
Prévôt des Marchands and the intendant of Paris, and now he is given the task of 
rendering a legal opinion on the question of whether those in authority in July were guilty 
(Shapiro 1993, 46, quoting Gustave Bord).  
 
One need only to read his report on behalf of the committee in which he claims to establish 
evidence of a conspiracy against the people, that this conspiracy constituted lèse-nation or lèse-
majesté, that those responsible included Besenval and his co-defendants, and that nothing could 
exonerate the criminals (Garran de Coulon 1789, 1-2).  According to Garran de Coulon, “not a 
single act of the new administration nor any movement of the [troops stationed in Paris] had the 
goal of tranquility in Paris.” Instead, the accumulation of military persons and munitions could 
                                                                                                                                                       
against Besenval suffered.  De Sèze, concerned for the safety of the old general, pleaded for a 
change in venue for the public investigation into Besenval, but was unsuccessful. 
15 It should be mentioned that some newspapers such as the Journal de Paris written by de 
Bruges gave favorable coverage to Besenval’s trial.  For a more in-depth exploration into the role 
of the press during this time, consult Revolutionary Justice in Paris 1789-1790 by Barry M. 
Shapiro (1993).  
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only be used for enacting this conspiracy against the people and for intimidation of the National 
Assembly (Idem. 31).  Attacking Besenval predominately, Garran de Coulon is unable to do 
anything more than reiterate the charges of the November 18th denunciation.  Nevertheless, he 
steadfastly asserted that it would be impossible to convince anyone that such inherently criminal 
actions could ever be done in the king’s interest or with his permission (Idem. 53-55). Yet, de 
Sèze set out to do just that: justify the legality of Besenval’s actions.   
DEFENSE AND ACQUITTAL 
 
In defense of the Swiss general, de Sèze touched on many problems.  First, he highlighted 
the great anomaly of the newly established crime of lèse-nation: Besenval is on trial for crimes 
outside of the law because the crime of lèse-nation has no common law or statutory definition.  
The National Assembly created a new word and new crime, but that does not equate the crime to 
the term, nor it mean the crime is formally established.  Such neologism is vague, ambiguous, 
and leaves the defendant on unequal footing before the law (Gaven 148). The crown prosecutor, 
Flandre de Brunville, representing the nation against Besenval even confessed his desire for a 
more specific definition of lèse-nation in April 1791: 
I endlessly wished that a decree by the National Assembly clearly and precisely 
determined all of the offenses that could have been considered lèse-nation.  I expressed 
this desire a number of times to several members of the National Assembly and you will 
be easily convinced, Sir, that if the National Assembly had handled my request, the 
Châtelet would have found itself in less difficult and less embarrassing circumstances 
(Gaven 152, quoting AN BB/3/19, dossier 1, lettre de Flandre de Brunville).16  
 
                                                
16 J’aurais infiniment souhaité qu’un décret de l’Assemblée nationale déterminât d’une manière 
claire et précise tous les délits qui pouvaient être considérés comme crime de lèse-nation. J’ai 
témoigné nombre de fois ce voeu à plusieurs membres de l’Assemblée nationale et vous serez 
facilement convaincu, Monsieur, que si l’Assemblée nationale eût pu s’occuper de cet objet, le 
Châtelet se fût trouvé dans des circonstances moins difficiles et moins embarrassantes. 
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Boucher d’Argis, presiding judge in Besenval’s trial and publicist for criminal law reform, was 
known for his favorable disposition towards criminal defendants and naturally subscribed to 
similar beliefs (Gaven 149). 
The second argument used by de Sèze revolved around the creation of the crime of lèse-
nation.  Because the crime of lèse-nation did not exist as of July 14th, 1789 and because the laws 
can only be applied prospectively (as opposed to retroactively), Besenval could not be found 
guilty of lèse-nation. Therefore, the court would have to find Besenval guilty of crimes that were 
contrary to law of the Old Regime (Idem. 150).  Framing the court case in old law assured an 
easy defense of legality.  Instead of showing that Besenval’s actions were not contrary to the 
undefined will of the nation and its security, de Sèze opted to prove that at the time of the actions 
taken by Besenval, those actions were sanctioned and legal.  
Thirdly, de Sèze objected to the personal jurisdiction over the baron de Besenval.  He 
asked the judges of the Châtelet: “Gentlemen, are you truly the judges of the baron de 
Besenval?”  Treaties between France and Switzerland guaranteed that Swiss guards in the 
service of the French king under criminal suspicions would be tried by a Swiss court (Idem. 
295).  Furthermore, Besenval and his codefendants were certainly entitled to a change in 
personal jurisdiction17 as old French law would have all military members and high dignitaries 
tried by the Parlement of Paris (Idem. 296).  Although Besenval could raise a proper defense on 
the ambiguity of the law and on his Swiss nationality, it was not necessary to maintain this battle 
                                                
17 Interestingly enough, in giving the Châtelet subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of lèse-
nation, the National Assembly bypassed old traditions of regional jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction.  For example, people accused of lèse-nation in Lyon would have to be tried in Paris.  
Furthermore, if that person was a noble normally entitled to be tried by the Parlement of Paris, 
that person was nevertheless tried by the Châtelet.  Though, having personal jurisdiction over a 
Swiss citizen may have exceeded the powers of the Châtelet.   
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of legality because all people involved showed to be favorable to the defendant.  Asking for a 
change of jurisdiction to military or Swiss courts would jeopardize a likely acquittal (Idem. 149).  
The issue for people wishing Besenval’s condemnation and execution was that little 
evidence of a July Conspiracy could be found.  Witness testimony contradicted other witness 
testimony, and no letters or other writings corroborated the Comité de recherches’ claim that 
Besenval planned to siege Paris and disrupt the National Assembly (Révolutions de Paris Issues 
No. 25-30).  To make matters worse for those seeking vengeance, Besenval maintained his 
tranquility and courtier-like nature while at the Châtelet; surrounded by friends that visited him 
in prison and at the court, his character represented that of an old general amicably conversing 
with Parisians, rather than a counter-revolutionary bent on the downfall of liberty (Shapiro 1993, 
157; Besenval 1805, 433).  The end question to answer for both Besenval and Lambesc is 
whether or not one can punish the commanders for following legitimate orders from and 
approved by ministers of the king (Gaven 177). 
Shapiro views Besenval’s order to de Launay as sufficient for conviction but argues that 
the judges were not inclined to punish the Old Regime (158).  But this would ignore, as Shapiro 
himself puts it, that all testimony was in Besenval’s favor and none of those deposed gave any 
evidence of the rumored July conspiracy.  “Besenval’s defenders were even able to persuade a 
part of the public, not that the conspiracy did not exist, but that there was no legal proof of it” 
(Shapiro 1993, 160, quoting Garran de Coulon 1790).  Just as it was in the case of Lambesc, the 
Châtelet had to consider the people’s desire to prosecute and punish.  While these people, as 
previously shown, certainly clamored for Besenval’s head (as shown through the press 
statements), the execution of Favras on the day of Besenval’s acquittal satisfied the masses’ 
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appetite for revenge. Shapiro argues, succinctly, “Favras’ execution served, in effect, as 
Besenval’s ticket to freedom” (124).18  
In fact, rather than suffer the noose, Gaven finds that the publicity of the Besenval trial 
allowed for his redemption in the eyes of the public.  De Sèze and de Bruges worked tirelessly to 
prove that the Baron’s actions were legal prior to the “Revolution of July 14th” (Gaven 463).  
The public hearing and lengthy statement by de Sèze guaranteed that those in attendance left 
with respect for the old general who just followed legitimate, albeit careless, orders.   Besenval 
did not suffer the same injury to memory as Lambesc and Favras, even if just for the short time 
he lived thereafter.  The Châtelet formally acquitted Besenval and his co-conspirators of all 
charges on March 1st, 1790.   
TRIAL BY PROXY: THE OLD REGIME 
 
The Besenval affair led to the creation of a particular tribunal for those accused of lèse-
nation.  His detention was entirely illegal and unjustifiable without proper proceedings in a court 
of competent jurisdiction.  Hence the rushed decision on October 14th, 1789 to place Besenval—
and all others accused of lèse-nation—under the investigatory supervision of the Châtelet.  The 
National Assembly gave adjudicatory powers to the Châtelet one week later on October 21st, 
1789 (Idem. 282-283, 295).  It should be noted that the judges were not changed nor appointed 
by the provisional government.  The Old Regime judges remained in charge of the cases against 
the Old Regime, “or at least its last efforts of existence” (Idem. 175, 290). Bestowing an 
institution of the Old Regime with powers to judge the administration and military members 
prior to the Revolution guaranteed the acquittal of its representatives. 
                                                
18 Shapiro’s theory of the Besenval-Favras Judicial Transaction will be analyzed in-depth in the 
proceeding section.  
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In the case of Besenval, the three courts—social, political, and judicial—intermingled from the 
very outset.   In reaction to the public’s sacking of the Bastille prison, the legislative body 
created a new law to punish the military that allowed the violence of July 1789.  Within days of 
its creation, militiamen in a nearby town apprehended the fugitive aristocrat and procedural 
chaos ensued due to conflicting interventions of the different courts.  On one hand, political 
officials pled for amnesty; on the other, journalists pressed for punishment.  The result was a 
complicated legal processing of Besenval by the Comité de recherches and the Châtelet.  In the 
end, Besenval’s counsel eventually secured his acquittal by showing that Besenval represented 
no threat to the provisional government (since he was merely following orders legitimate at the 
time of execution).  The political officials then negotiated behind closed doors and enacted the 
Favras-Besenval transaction, which appeased society’s quest for revenge on the defenders of the 
Old Regime.  All justices satisfied, Besenval left the Châtelet without injury to his reputation, 
threat of political persecution, or danger of potential punishment.
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INTERLUDE 2—ANALYZING THE FAVRAS-BESENVAL JUDICIAL TRANSACTION 
In the first interlude, the assumption that Lambesc was acquitted based on Besenval’s 
acquittal came into question.  This section takes the argument one step further and looks at 
Shapiro’s theory that “Favras’s execution served, in effect, as Besenval’s ticket to freedom” 
(1993, 124). Besenval was the face of the aristocratic conspiracy of July just as Favras became 
the figurehead for a general aristocratic conspiracy of December (Idem. 148-149). Upon the 
arrest of Favras on December 24th, 1789, he became the new head conspirator and enemy 
number one of the nation.  In early January as both trials occurred concurrently, the Châtelet 
judges came under heavy criticism for showing apparent leniency towards Besenval, including 
smiling at the defendant.  Public interrogation of Favras began on January 9th and reportedly 
10,000 people showed up on January 11th to demonstrate against both Favras and Besenval 
(Idem. 150). People began to confuse the two conspiracies and decried the unfair treatment of 
Besenval effectively causing cessation of all partiality from the magistrates of the Châtelet in 
recognition of the popular disgruntlement. While the newspapers blamed the public turmoil on 
the aristocratic conspiracy, it was more likely, as Shapiro suggests, that the people clamored for 
justice—quick, swift, and punitive.  Newspapers also reported that the evidence was enough to 
hang Favras and appease the people all the while maintaining Besenval’s innocence (Idem. 136-
165). Almost following a script written by these newspapers, the judges released Besenval 
finding no cause for a formal decree of arrest on the evening of January 29th and the next day 
Flandre de Brunville recommended the death penalty for Favras.  The people, satisfied with 
inevitable punishment of one conspiracy, allowed the great counter-revolutionary general of July 
to go free and without much coverage. 
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When looking at the Lambesc-Besenval theory discussed in Interlude 1, the two 
interpretations are at odds with each other in regard to agency of the accused.  Given that 
Besenval was guilty of the crimes of which he was accused, but was acquitted because of 
political manipulation, how can one argue that Lambesc is not guilty?  Gaven, the author of the 
Lambesc-Besenval connection, rightly avoids this paradox by denying any attempt to define a 
‘judicial transaction’ between Favras and the military men. There was a fundamental difference 
in the two cases: Favras was tried for acts rumored to be currently going on while people such as 
Lambesc and Besenval were tried for acts committed under the old government.  In fact, the 
actions of the latter individuals should have been viewed outside the statute of limitations for any 
criminalization not only because the actions were approved by the government (thereby 
legitimizing the use of violence), but also because the crime for which they were charged, lèse-
nation, did not exist at the time the actions were taken (Gaven 247).  The hypothesis of judicial 
transaction nevertheless, Gaven argues, holds water for those wishing to explore the fragility of 
the Châtelet in exercising this novel judicial justice.  
Furthermore, Shapiro’s theory of a judicial transaction falls within the theory of multiple 
justices enounced herein.  Both trials were subject to the same social, political, and judicial 
pressures.  Social justice demanded punishment; political justice demanded stability; and judicial 
justice was subject to both.  In regard to the last, both Favras and Besenval could have been 
found guilty of lèse-nation, but judges were inclined to listen to the public clamor and political 
appeals.  Besenval, the nearly seventy-year-old general, was no threat to political stability and 
his social standing, having recovered from the initial onslaught of bad press in July and August, 
was only called into question by the appearance of Favras and renewed interest in the 
proceedings before the Châtelet.  Favras, as will be seen, represented a very real threat to the 
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precarious political relationship between the crown and the people and the public viewed his 
version of the aristocratic conspiracy as legitimate. The judicial transaction allowed the Châtelet 
to expertly navigate the multiple justices and find a solution that pleased the people, political 
officials, and the law.   
 
 
CHAPTER 4—MARQUIS DE FAVRAS: SACRIFICE TO SOCIO-POLITICAL JUSTICE 
Favras’s punishment will satisfy the Nation’s need for a great 
example.  It can be said that all the aristocrats have been hung 
through him. –Camille Desmoulins (Shapiro 1992, 667) 
 
The most memorable of the lèse-nation cases stems from yet another counter 
revolutionary conspiracy aimed at the citizens of Paris.  The marquis de Favras, victim of the 
expedited trial, would be the only person executed for his alleged crimes (until the trial of king 
Louis XVI and proceeding Terror) (Shapiro 1993, 124).  As a member of the (minor) aristocracy 
and military, his case is exemplary of the complex interplay between social, political, and 
judicial justices.  While he most certainly suffered from the “absence of investigatory rigor [and] 
tendency towards pragmatic and secret judicial arrangements,” he lost his case as a result of 
extra-judicial pressure and would go down as a martyr to appease the Parisian public’s thirst for 
revenge against supposed conspirators (Idem. 123).  Primed by rumors propagated by the 
National Assembly and revolutionary forces, his case and ultimately iniquitous judgment would 
become the patsy for the aristocracy and servants of the Old Regime.   
WHO IS THE MARQUIS DE FAVRAS? 
 
Thomas de Mahy, marquis de Favras was born in Blois on March 26th, 1744.1  His family 
claimed nobility since the 14th century but had since fallen into impoverishment only owning the 
                                                
1 There are several interesting facts that make the marquis de Favras an enigmatic character.  His 
name was written Thomas de Mahi and mispronunciation of the noble particle may have 
contributed to his designation as marquis, since, as Cleray (1932) notes, there never existed a 
marquisate of Favras.  The family resided in Blois and had many homes in the surrounding 
regions, but all were baronies or nothing at all.  Additionally, much of what historians know 
about Favras comes from his brother, Guillaume-François, baron de Cormeré who acted as his 
counsel during the trial and wrote a justification of Favras’ actions after his death.  His 1791 
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barony of Cormeré (Valon 123). Frankly, Favras had more titles than assets (Shapiro 1993, 123).  
As was common for the poor nobility, Favras joined a group of musketeers in 1755 and served 
six years as a military man.  In 1761, he obtained his own company of dragoons and was named 
capitaine-aide-major of the régiment de Chapt a.k.a Belzunce. Then, in 1773, he became the First 
Lieutenant of the Swiss Guards under the comte de Provence2 but resigned in 1776 (Cormeré 3-
6).3  Around this time he sought to regain prestige and married the German noblewoman Victoria 
Edwige Caroline, princess d’Anhalt-Bernburg-Schaumburg.  His new connection to royalty (and 
appearance at the court) renewed his friendship with the comte de Provence who offered his 
protection (Valon 1095).  In 1785, Favras approached a recruitment officer, Tourcaty, to rekindle 
his military career in 1785 in reaction to the riots in Holland (Cormeré 8). Instead, he undertook 
a project to liquidate the French debt, moved to Versailles, and worked occasionally with 
Tourcaty whom he considered “an honest military man” (Idem. 9).  His great finance plan would 
nevertheless run into political opposition who classified Favras by “his origins, his services, his 
relations, and even recognition as belonging to the aristocracy and the court” (Valon 1097).4  He 
                                                                                                                                                       
Justification will be used throughout to provide the point of view most favorable to Favras.  The 
claims contained therein should nevertheless be taken with a grain of salt. For greater discussion, 
see the final section of this chapter. Finally, Cleray (1932) marks the year of birth as 1741.  He 
goes on to disagree with every major date in Favras’s military career.   
2 The comte de Provence is also known as Monsieur or as the future Louis XVIII. 
3 Cormeré claims that Thomas left the regiment to attend to pressing matters at his residence in 
Vienna, namely restoring his wife’s paternal connection to prince Charles-Louis d’Anhalt-
Bernburg-Schaumburg-Hoym. Alexis de Valon claimed over 150 years later that the marquis 
actually ran out of funds to continue his office.  These two stories are not incompatible as 
marrying a princess of a German state would certainly benefit Favras economically, but only if 
her lineage could be confirmed. 
4 If interested, his economic proposition can be found in the Bibliothèque nationale de France’s 
digitized collection, Gallica, under the title of Le déficit des finances de la France vaincu par un 
mode de reconstitutions annuitaires, qui opérera aussi, en trente ans, la libération de la dette 
nationale.  
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replied, warning against the novations of the revolution and the risk they posed to the king 
(Favras 1789c, 1; Valon 1097). Thus began his unfortunate label as counter revolutionary. 
FAVRAS CONSPIRACY 
 
At the outbreak of the revolution on July 14th, Favras’s worries became justified as the 
masses began assembling and attacking vestiges of the Old Regime.  To complicate matters, on 
September 21st, 1789, Jean Philippe Morel informed LaFayette of a new aristocratic conspiracy 
similar to the plot associated with Augeard earlier in the year: loyalist troops would take over 
Paris and Versailles, LaFayette and Bailly would be killed,5 the National assembly dissolved, and 
the king seized and brought to Metz or Peronne (Shapiro 1993, 125).  LaFayette gave Morel an 
official commission with orders to find out more about the plot (Révolutions de Paris, Issues No. 
34-35; Cormeré 20).  Morel immediately targeted the marquis de Favras who had expressed 
resistance to “innovations,” meaning the Revolution (Favras 1789c, 7).  According to this 
informant, Favras went so far as to ask the Minister of War, Saint-Priest, for a large number of 
men to form the loyalist forces necessary to transport the king to safety as early as July 17th, but, 
Saint-Priest could not furnish the required horses for the expedition (Shapiro 1993, 125-126). 
Saint-Priest, for his part, denied this conversation and all conversations prior to October (AN 
BB/3/221).  Instead, he corrected the date to the October 5th, 1789 when Favras, forever loyal to 
the king and present at Versailles castle during the memorable October Days march,6 plead for a 
                                                
5 Shapiro discredits all allegations about the assassination plans and speculates that such a plan 
originated as an embellishment in the mind of the accuser Morel.  In the writings of Louis XVIII, 
the future-king denied all claims of an assassination.  It could be that Morel saw his evidence as 
insufficient for conviction and decided to embellish the risk Favras posed to the people in power.  
6 For those unfamiliar with the October Days of 1789, this event refers to the march on Versailles 
by Parisian citizens (mainly women) in order to bring the king back to Paris proper in order to 
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regiment of horses in order to drive back the masses and save the king, a foolhardy request that 
Saint-Priest promptly denied (Shapiro 1993, 126; Valon 1099).  After this refusal, Favras 
contented to escort the king on his return to Paris (Valon).7 
Favras, per Morel, began assembling a counter revolutionary army, exceeding the plans 
of October 5th, which included only defensive measures to protect the person of the king.  In 
addition to Morel, the Comité des recherches hired a spy, Geoffrey, to follow Favras and 
discover this revolutionary group (Valon 1103). Investigation revealed that Favras’s accomplice8 
in this conspiracy was the comte de Luxembourg who had previously argued that the “authority 
of the monarchy could only be recovered by ‘establishing a Supreme General and by naming a 
new commander of the Paris militia” (Shapiro 1993, 127, 142).9  In addition to Luxembourg, 
Favras contacted Tourcaty and inquired about raising a regiment.  According to Tourcaty,10 
                                                                                                                                                       
ensure a continuing supply of food.  It began as a redress of grievances (price of bread) and 
ended with Louis XVI captive in Paris. 
7 According to Alexis de Valon, whose evident support for royalty raises doubts about his 
neutrality, Favras met Pierre Marquié during this march.  The member of the National Guard 
supposedly cried at the sight of the captive king and queen, which led Favras to believe he had a 
potential ally.  As will be seen, this assumption would cost him.   
8 Favras’s potential accomplices are numerous. Cleray and Valon point to Jean-Baptiste, comte 
de LaMarck, Maillebois, Augeard, and even Mirabeau.  While these people may have had plans 
to help the king or queen, evidence never implicated any of the aforementioned people. Augeard, 
in his memoires, claims to have been told by the marquise de Favras that her husband was in 
league with the comte de La Châtre, comte de Luxembourg, marquis de Lévis, and even the 
banker Chomel.  
9 The comte de Luxembourg was member of the Royal Bodyguards.  During the October March, 
Marie-Antoinette actually gave permission to Luxembourg for use of two hundred horses in the 
case that the king should be in danger.  He never used them.  LaFayette, who knew of the plot, 
may have dissuaded Luxembourg from proceeding with the conspiracy.   
10 The timeline of events according to the testimony of Morel and Tourcaty do not line up.  
According to Morel, he learned of the conspiracy from Tourcaty who learned it from Favras 
himself.  Tourcaty allegedly met with Favras sometime around the July 17th, 1789, but Favras 
and Cormeré deny this meeting time and suggest a meeting in October or November (Cormeré 
claims the date as November 15th), which is well after Morel informed LaFayette on September 
15th.  It is likely that Morel spoke of a general aristocratic conspiracy to LaFayette, gained his 
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1,200 horses were stationed in Versailles and Favras relied on him to supply the men.  This small 
force would be used to take the king to the provinces, under the protection of an additional escort 
of 22,000 men, and afterwards, Favras would recruit 150,000 to reassert the king’s authority 
(Shapiro 1993, 144-145; AN BB/3/221, deposition of Tourcaty).  The man to supply the 22,000 
men was Jean-Philippe Marquié, an officer in the National Guard.  Wishing to foment discontent 
within the national guards, Favras tried to convince Marquié that LaFayette showed favoritism 
towards other regiments (Shapiro 1993, 141).  On the fourth meeting, Favras brought a copy of 
Ouvrez donc les yeux, a counter-revolutionary pamphlet berating the destructive nature of the so-
called nation: 
You [the people] were always the Nation the most polite, the most generous, and the 
most kind of all the Civilized Nations.  Now, you are the most savage…Today, you want 
to bathe in the blood of one another (1).11  
 
Marquié refused to meet with Favras afterwards (Shapiro 1993, 142).  These actions constitute 
the primary cause of action against the marquis de Favras.  Tourcaty and Morel worked for 
LaFayette in the name of the nation and collected evidence to support an open-and-shut trial 
using Favras’ own words against him (particularly those of a meeting on November 15th during 
which Favras expressed concern over “rumors of assassinating the king”). The spy tracked 
Favras and was ready to apprehend the suspected criminal at any time.  Why did they wait? 
                                                                                                                                                       
commission to investigate, and later attributed those elements to Favras.  Shapiro comes to a 
similar conclusion. 
11 Historians contest the authorship of the pamphlet, though some, such as Shapiro and Valon, 
attribute it in part to the marquis de Favras.  He cannot be the sole author if one believes the 
pamphlet, since he is not a member of the National Assembly. 
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A TRIAL BY PROXY: COMTE DE PROVENCE? 
 
Sometime in November, the comte de Provence contracted Favras to secure a sizeable 
loan (two million French pounds) for reasons disputed during the trial and thereafter.  In the 
personal papers of the late Louis XVIII, published in Le Correspondant in January of 1910, he 
lamented having ever listened to the marquis de Favras, suggesting that Favras convinced him of 
plans to escape with the king.  The comte de Provence admitted that Favras worked to acquire a 
loan on his behalf, which contradicts his initial testimony to the Hôtel de Ville that stated the 
purpose of the loan as renovation of his home (Gaven 250; Shapiro 1993, 136).  Whatever the 
true reason may have been, Favras worked on acquiring funds from several Dutch bankers.  
Morel, whom Tourcaty introduced to Favras in November, suggested contacting Mr. Pomaret 
(Cormeré 15).  Instead, Favras contacted a different banker by the name of Chomel.  This choice 
would prove fatal.  Believing the negotiations to be fruitful, Favras acquired the paperwork from 
the comte de Provence identifying him as the guarantor of the loan and Chomel was ready to 
give the first installment as of December 24th, 1789.  Instead of meeting Favras at the home of 
the comte’s treasurer, Papillon de la Ferté, Chomel went to LaFayette with the crucial evidence 
of active execution of a conspiracy and Geoffrey arrested Favras that night bringing him directly 
to the Comité des recherches (Shapiro 1993, 131-132).12 
On the morning after Favras’s arrest, a placard was posted all over Paris by a person 
named Barauzz alleging that the comte de Provence was behind the plot (Shapiro 1993, 136, 
quoting Moniteur of December 28th, 1789).  Two days after the arrest of Favras, Jouve and Potel 
                                                
12 Interestingly, and perhaps inexplicably, the marquise de Favras was also arrested on this night 
despite a lack of charges against her.   
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printed a pamphlet confirming the role of the comte de Provence in the conspiracy; for their 
exposé, they would be tried for seditious writings (Gaven 224).  Général Thiébault, in his 
memoirs, accused the comte de Provence of having charged Favras with an escape plot and the 
execution of LaFayette and Necker.  Boullié claimed that Favras “acted under the prompting of 
the comte de Provence, and with the funds provided him by the comte de Provence” (Shapiro 
1993, 131, quoting Souvenirs et fragments of Bouillé).  In essence, the role of the comte de 
Provence is uncontested; his public appearance before the Hôtel de ville and his notes published 
posthumously only confirm this truth.   
Even though the comte de Provence acknowledged his master-servant relationship with 
Favras, he denied all ties to the abduction conspiracy.  While this certainly was hard to believe, 
the Comité des recherches was not in a position to press the matter.  Implicating a member of the 
royal family would bring scandal and destabilize the precarious policy of reconciliation with the 
aristocracy that LaFayette promoted (Shapiro 1993, 136).  The ample evidence connecting the 
comte de Provence to Favras could not be used as political leverage and LaFayette begrudgingly 
admitted that while there were certainly more people involved in Favras’s escape plan, Favras 
was the scapegoat (Idem. 133).13  The marquis de Favras was just noble enough fit the general 
description of an aristocratic conspiracy, but not so noble to rupture the tenuous constitutional 
monarchy and relative stability.  Without the aid of the comte de Provence,14 who would not risk 
                                                
13 Parallels are easily drawn between the baron de Besenval and marquis de Favras.  While 
multiple defendants were or should have been listed by the Comité des recherches, only one 
person was held responsible for greater plots or actions.  
14 In a letter from Tirésias (pseudonym) to Favras, without a date, the comte de Provence seems 
to claim to have not been in contact nor seen Favras since 1775 and that he was unaware of the 
dealings of his treasurer, LaFerté This letter seems to contradict his initial speech to the Hôtel de 
Ville but supports some testimony that Favras sought the loan and planned on contacting the 
comte de Provence for approval.  Either way, it shows that the future Louis XVIII would not get 
involved in the political trial.  
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his political power for a mere acquaintance,15 no political faction had any real interest in saving 
Favras; his conviction seemed a foregone conclusion (Idem. 135).  
COMPARATIVE CONSPIRACY: BESENVAL, AUGEARD, AND TROUARD DE RIOLLE 
 
Rumors of a conspiracy to abduct16 the king spread across France as early as the months 
of May.  As time passed, more concrete allegations and plans began to form, namely propagated 
by the National Assembly.  The rumored Metz conspiracy and hunt for conspirators led to the 
arrest of multiple individuals such as Augeard and Favras.  So-called hunters discovered multiple 
plots but the conspirators, including comte de Toulouse-Lautrec, Nîmes Catholic militia, comte 
de Bussy, Camp de Jalès and three agents of the comte d’Artois, were let go (Idem. 146-147). 
Others such as Mirabeau were only accused of plotting without action (Cleray 33).  Paranoia 
searched for a face to put to the conspiracy and that face became the aristocracy, the clergy, and 
other personnel of the Old Regime (Gaven 250-252).  By the time of Favras’ capture, the people 
were already primed for a conviction, and Favras fit the profile of the dangerous noble willing to 
steal the king from his throne.   There were fourteen other counter-revolutionary conspiracies 
tried as lèse-nation.   Three of these cases ended in judgment: Favras (condemned to death on 
February 18th, 1790), Augeard (acquitted on March 29th, 1790), and Trouard de Riolles (freed of 
                                                
15 Use of the word acquaintance may belittle the relationship between the comte de Provence and 
Favras.  Favras had served the comte for years and the comte, in return, assured the education of 
Favras’s children. Historians have speculated on the comte’s feelings of guilt for the execution of 
Favras as the future Louis XVIII would continue to support the Favras lineage and give an 
allowance to Charles de Favras, his son.  
16 During the early French Revolution, the people still clung to the person of the king.  The 
National Assembly started in an effort to form a constitutional monarchy.  It is only natural that 
the conspiracy would not implicate the king himself but instead allege an abduction.  Close study 
of the time period shows that this was merely a socio-political fiction.  The king was free—so 
long as he did not leave Paris and acted in the interest of the National Assembly—and his efforts 
to flee in 1791 only confirmed his willingness to participate in the escape plans.   
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all charges as of August 13th, 1791) (Idem. 239-240).  To this list one can partially add Besenval 
whose ties to the aristocratic plot were slim to none as previously discussed.  Comparatively, the 
prosecutory brief against Favras pales in comparison to the briefs against Besenval and Augeard 
(Shapiro 1993, 134).  Yet, among this long list of conspirators whose names would become 
commonplace by the inkwells of historians, only the marquis de Favras died for his conspiracy.  
In order to answer this incredible phenomenon, I will distinguish the cases that ended in 
judgment and show that the heart of these cases was the question of whether or not the accused 
executed or attempted to execute the conspiracy or simply held criminal thoughts of counter-
revolution (Gaven 239). 
The first of the conspiracies, enacted by Augeard, preceded Favras by some months.  
After the denunciation by his personal secretary, law enforcement arrested Augeard under 
suspicion of preparing an escape plan for Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette.  Accused of 
planning, with the help of the bishop-comte de Châlons, to take the royal couple from Paris to 
Buzancy in Champagne (where he held land), Augeard was officially recommended to the 
Châtelet on October 29th, 1789 upon finding corroborating evidence of counter-revolutionary 
thought at the defendant’s home (Idem. 241).  De Châlons and Augeard immediately denied any 
involvement in such a conspiracy.  Only two paragraphs in Augeard’s personal notes provided 
any basis for the accusation of the so-called Metz Conspiracy; as his counsel Alexandre de 
Bonnières aptly explained, “simple thought never translated to action can never give rise to 
punishment.”  Expanding upon this idea, Augeard said: “I could have written the most absurd 
ideas...and I would never be held accountable if these writings never left my cabinets.  My 
thoughts are my own” (Idem. 242-243, quoting Mémoires by Mathieu Augeard).  Switching from 
the defensive to the offensive, additional counsel for Augeard, André Blonde, argued that his 
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client was only being pursued because he was “an aristocrat,” much like the Royal-Allemand 
claimed that Lambesc was charged for being related to Marie-Antoinette and how Besenval was 
initially arrested for being an aristocratic fugitive (Idem. 464).  The judges of the Châtelet, in 
their most conciliatory ways, acquitted Augeard on March 29th, 1790 because of a lack of proper 
physical evidence of any counter-revolutionary act. Loustalot pointed out similarities to Favras 
in his newspaper Révolution de Paris: 
The marquis de Favras planned to take the king to Péronne, while Augeard planned to 
make him go to Metz.  Favras wanted to have 1,200 cavalry and 20,000 malcontents 
ready to follow the king, while Augeard wanted to assemble the nobility to form an army 
of 40,000 men.  Favras was accused of wanting to dissolve the National Assembly by 
setting off a civil war.  Augeard favored the same plan (Shapiro 1993, 141, quoting 
Révolutions de Paris).  
 
Of course, Loustalot conveniently ignores that Favras did not only plan to form an army, but he 
actively recruited.  The conspiracies are nearly identical in every aspect, but the attempt of 
execution transmutes the criminal thought into undisputable treason.   
As for Trouard de Riolles, he was arrested on July 8th, 1790 at Bourgoin under suspicion 
of developing abduction plans.  Search and seizure of his effects led to the discovery of 
potentially incriminating evidence suggesting, a general insurrection of the provinces.  Without 
further investigation into the documents, the National Assembly decreed Trouard de Riolle as the 
linchpin of a conspiracy to relocate the king to Turin on September 11th, 1790.  Further 
investigation revealed absolutely no basis for this accusation and revealed the documents to be 
polls of public opinion in favor of the king (Gaven 244-245).  The Châtelet would nevertheless 
linger before transferring the case to the Haute Cour Provisoire who, on August 13th, 1791, 
declared “the non-existence of proof or clues of a project or plan of conspiracy against the State” 
and subsequent exoneration of Trouard de Riolles (Idem. 246).  Once again, those accused of 
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lèse-nation could not be held responsible for criminal thought.  The liberty of opinion protected 
by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen remained intact.   
As opposed to both Augeard and Trouard de Riolles, the judges in charge of Favras 
believed that the case went beyond mere thoughts (Ibid).  Different from the cases of Besenval or 
Lambesc, whose actions were temporally outside of the scope of the revolutionary justice, Favras 
had to answer for an ongoing conspiracy amidst widespread paranoia of such a plot (Idem. 247). 
During his interrogation and investigation, Favras had to justify several recent actions: 
distributing written materials against the National Assembly including Ouvrez donc les yeux, 
recommending counter-revolutionary action, and reacting harshly to the “horror” of the return of 
the king to Paris (Ibid). The investigation did not probe into his counter-revolutionary thoughts; 
instead Favras needed to justify his counter-revolutionary actions.   
AN EXPEDITED PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE 
 
Morel, Tourcaty, and Chomel initially denounced Favras to the Comité municipal de 
recherches on the December 24th, 1789 after his arrest at the home of Papillon de La Ferté (Idem. 
248).  Two days later, the Comité des recherches published the formal indictment of lèse-nation, 
using the information provided by the first two men.  This was not unexpected as, to all three 
men, Favras previously admitted to be the author of the escape plan for which he faced 
persecution and attempted to enlist their aid in the criminal activity (Ibid).  Interestingly enough, 
Favras’ counsel—attorneys LaFerrière, Thilorier, and his brother Cormeré—only discovered the 
source of the denunciations a month after the formal indictment and once the criminal 
investigation concluded, despite the law of November 3rd, 1789, which guaranteed that the 
accused had the right to know his accuser within twenty-four hours of his arrest and 
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imprisonment (Gaven 454; AN BB/3/221).  From the very beginning of the investigation, 
procedural irregularity became the norm.  There were no public briefs and no public 
appearances.  The only documents released were police documents and the formal denunciation 
(Shapiro 1993, 134).  Investigating magistrates and members of the Comité des recherches, 
“oriented the interrogations and reduced the scope of the investigation to hasten the end of the 
trial” (Gaven 250).17  The only case that would result in the death penalty ended in under two 
months—record time for that period. 
From December 24th, 1789 to February 8th, 1790, the Châtelet heard testimony from 
several bankers (Abbema, Pomaret, and Chomel), military men (Morel, Tourcaty, Marquié, and 
Geoffrey), and a total of twenty-five witnesses, paling in comparison to the several dozen 
witnesses called to investigate Lambesc and Besenval.18  The bankers spoke of everything from 
Favras’s seemingly irrelevant plans of raising a regiment to go to Brabant to the loan to be used 
in the Peronne Plan to abduct the king.  In fact, testimony by Chomel transformed the Brabant 
plan to quell the Holland insurrection in the name of the French into a Brabant counterrevolution 
to amass an army, storm into Paris, and take the king by force.  Chomel provided a brief 
statement and opinion that the abduction plan was “fully formed” and supposed to take place 
outside of Paris (Cleray 45; Cormeré 77-78).  Among the fifteen exhibits before the court, nine 
letters to and from the banker Chomel constituted the substance of the case; none showed any 
                                                
17 Gaven originally attributes the rapidity of the trial to Omer Talon, lieutenant civil and 
investigating magistrate in the case.  But, Cormeré specifically mentions Talon as one of the 
judges who “insisted on the necessity of admitting substantiating facts” presented by Favras and 
his counsel.   
18 Eleven witnesses testified on behalf of the prosecution and fourteen testified on behalf of 
Favras according to Cormeré.   
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connection between the loan and the Brabant plan (Cleray 19-24; AN BB/3/221).19  His letters 
provided, however, clear and convincing evidence of the loan for two million pounds.  In the 
Justification de Thomas Mahy de Favras, Cormeré came to the conclusion that Chomel worked 
for the Comité des recherches and that he had intentions of trapping Favras when negotiations 
with Morel’s accomplice, Pomaret, broke down (Cleray 63-64).  Regardless of the intentions of 
Chomel, the evidence showed that Favras had hoped to execute some plan that would have cost 
an exorbitant amount of money for that time.  With the comte de Provence denying any 
connection to the two million pounds, the loan’s purpose was left to speculation by the judges of 
the Châtelet.  
Meanwhile the military men testified to Favras’s attempt to foment discontent among the 
National Guard and overthrow LaFayette.  Only Morel spoke of the assassination plans against 
Bailly, LaFayette, and Necker.  Morel, in fact, produced an eight-page deposition—four times 
longer than the official indictment—and recounted Favras’s alleged crimes in detail (AN 
BB/3/221, deposition of Morel).  Several times he reported to LaFayette who insisted on 
continued surveillance.  Morel became the equivalent of a modern undercover cop.  Tourcaty, for 
his part, only corroborated the facts presented by Morel.  As Cormeré would later quip, Morel 
and Tourcaty were one (Cormeré 53).  Favras’s attorneys attempted to exclude the testimony of 
Morel and Tourcaty for reasons of prejudice, probable entrapment, and because they were the 
informants, but the judges refused this request because counsels’ objections were “non-pertinent 
and inadmissible” (Gaven 248-249; Cormeré 4).  Practice said that political cases did not follow 
the common law of excluding the testimony of the informant (Shapiro 1993, 143).  Furthermore, 
                                                
19 Should any reader wish to consult the correspondence between Favras and Chomel, Cleray 
(1932) reproduced, in part, the archival materials in his book L’affaire Favras (d’après les 
document inédits). I am unaware of any English translations of these texts.   
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the Châtelet ruled that it was the commune’s Procureur Syndic responsible for legally 
denouncing Favras, despite Morel and Tourcaty being the source of the information.  As for 
Marquié, his deposition only confirmed that Favras was in communication with members of the 
National Guard and that both he and Favras wanted to ensure that the king was safe, however, 
Favras believed that the king was not safe in Paris (AN BB/3/221, deposition of Marquié). 
Favras, for his part, initially denied everything save for the negotiation with Chomel for a 
loan of “up to two million pounds” but wrote to the president of the Comité des recherches on 
December 26th asking for publication and communication of “his ideas” to the National 
Assembly in order to bring light to the “bizarre denunciations against him that result in his 
captivity.”  Confident of his ability to provide a satisfactory explanation, Favras even requested 
his release (AN AB/XIX/5299, emphasis in letter by Favras).   This request was not granted and 
the investigation proceeded amid growing interest from the public. 
DEFENSE AGAINST THE PUBLIC SPHERE OUTRAGED 
 
As the hearings took place, the public became poignantly invested in the outcome of 
Favras’s case.  Parisians, who already stalked the grounds of the Châtelet in anticipation of 
Besenval’s case, took immediately to reporting the aristocratic conspiracy attributed to Favras 
through the press.  On the January 30th, 1790, the Châtelet acquitted Besenval of all charges and 
only Favras remained as target of the onlookers’ disdain (Cleray 84).  His counsel, Thilorier, 
LaFerrière, and Cormeré had to fight an uphill battle against public perception and outrage 
(Gaven 460). 
The judges kept the doors to the court open to civilians from the moment of the 
indictment of Favras (Idem. 441).  Much to Favras’ chagrin, his trial became theatre for as many 
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people as the Châtelet could house and emotionally charged due to constant interruptions by this 
crowd.  While other defendants of lèse-nation, such as Besenval, benefited from the public 
audience, Favras did not.  Thilorier, in a pleading before the court on January 30th, 1790, 
displayed, according to some papers, “anti-patriotic” sentiment when he accused the prosecution 
of “submitting to the cruel opinion and unjust anathema of the people” (Idem 463, quoting 
Moniteur universel February 3rd, 1790). The people came to hate Thilorier as much as they hated 
Favras.20  Thilorier, save for his appearance before the court on January 30th, and pleading on 
February 18th, did not attend the other investigatory meetings before the Châtelet; or, at least 
there is no indication of his presence (Idem. 460). At this time Gaillard de La Ferrière sent the 
Révolutions de Paris two letters in an attempt to win public opinion, or at least counter the 
negative press against Thilorier and his client (Révolutions de Paris, March 4th, 1790). 
In defense of Favras, Cormeré and Thilorier pursued multiple legal theories, stressed the 
positive support of the monarchy exhibited by Favras, and decried the unjust investigation and 
law.  Already mentioned was their attempt at excluding the testimony of Morel and Tourcaty.  
When this plan failed, they gave multiple reasons for impeachment: Morel received 
compensation for her information;21 he provided the information for the official indictment; the 
accuser has the burden to supply corroborating evidence of his testimony; the information in his 
deposition is suspect for its omniscience; part of his testimony, if proven false, gives reason to 
reject the entire testimony; and, since Morel had a personal interest in the outcome of the case, 
his testimony is questionable (Cormeré 58-67). As for the testimony of Tourcaty, Favras claimed 
                                                
20 Thilorier would go on to respond to the Moniteur universel by saying that he almost refused to 
take the defense because of his patriotism, but relented to the pleas of a desperate family.   
21 LaFayette gave Morel an official position in the Garde Nationale for his service. 
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to have witnesses that were present at the incriminating discussion of July 17th,22 during which 
Favras allegedly revealed his abduction and assassination plans: the sirs de Vérginy, de Léval, 
and de Saint-Maurice (Idem. 48-58).  The judges of the Châtelet refused to hear them.  So, 
Thilorier proceeded to go through the same impeachment process for the same reasons as Morel 
and emphasized the “sensible formality” of an accused’s right to confront his accuser.  Thilorier 
and Cormeré effectively cross-examined23 nearly every witness provided by the Comité des 
recherches, even those they deemed insignificant.  Throughout the trial, Thilorier and Cormeré 
pointed out the great discrepancy between the theory of a “vast conspiracy” and the sole 
conspirator Favras.  How could one man buy 1,200 horses and uniforms, recruit over 800 
soldiers, and then lead this group to deliver Louis XVI to Metz? (Gaven 249, quoting Dernier 
plaidoyer by Thilorier). By impeaching Morel and Tourcaty and casting reasonable doubt on the 
lowly marquis’ capacity to overthrow the nation, Favras’s attorneys effectively severed the ties 
between Favras’s seemingly too-royalist conversations with Marquié and the bank loan obtained 
through Chomel.  
After properly attacking the facts presented by all of the witnesses, Thilorier, much like 
de Sèze, argued, “the novelty and indeterminate nature of the crime must defer judgment by the 
Châtelet definitively” (Idem. 150). His pleading started with this question: 
Do you believe yourselves, sirs, capable of ruling today on a crime that the National 
Assembly has not yet defined, or do you wait to abuse the terrible power conferred to you 
when the legislative body defines its limits? (Ibid)24  
 
                                                
22 As a reminder, Favras disputes this date and claims it was much later. 
23 Favras even compared the testimony of Morel and Tourcaty side by side in order to point out 
the contradiction in his Supplément au mémoire (1790c).  
24 Croirez-vous, Messieurs, pouvoir prendre sur vous de prononcer, dès à présent, sur un crime 
que l’Assemblé nationale n’a pas encore jugé à propos de définir ou attendrez-vous, pour user du 
pouvoir terrible qui vous est confié, qu’il ait plu au corps législatif d’en fixer les bornes?” 
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The ambiguity of lèse-nation posed risks to the fragile Châtelet; the legislator, not the courts, 
should have declared the proper definition. Furthermore, he argued that the judges must not 
pronounce the punishment for the crime, but instead by the law, which, at this point, was 
completely silent.  Thilorier rejected the comparison with lèse-majesté as the crime of lèse-nation 
contained nuances yet to be defined.  For example, Favras’s concern over the king’s safety 
would not seem to infringe upon the king, but it may be considered injurious to the nation (Idem. 
151). 
But, for the judges of the Châtelet, “obtaining an unjustified loan, negotiations with 
bankers, attempts of corrupting an officer of the National Guard, and association with Tourcaty 
and Morel in efforts to constitute a new royal guard” sufficed as clear evidence of the conspiracy 
against the nation (Idem. 250). “Thirty-eight judges united to decide the fate of Favras 
deliberated under the pressure of the passions of the street,” and on the February 18th, 1790, 
Favras was found guilty and condemned to death (Cleray 84).25  His execution was set for the 
next day.  
SOCIO-POLITICAL SACRIFICE 
 
Did the courts of Paris have reasonable suspicion of an aristocratic conspiracy at the 
hands of the marquis de Favras? Yes.  Did the Comité des recherches provide enough evidence 
to bring the possible conspiracy to trial? Yes.  Did the prosecution provide a preponderance of 
evidence that the conspiracy against the nation existed and that Favras attempted its execution?  
                                                
25 Interestingly enough, the official judgment uses the name “Thomas de Mahy, marquis de 
Favras” three times and three times his title was crossed out.  Used throughout the trial, he 
became lesser upon being found guilty.  Even his ribbon representing membership to the Order 
of Saint-Louis was stripped from his person and tacked to his final judgment.  It remains in the 
archives with his case folder.   
 
 
101 
No.  If Favras was unsuccessful in his plan to abduct the king, did the marquis’ actions merit the 
death penalty when the judges would normally apply Revolutionary penal code leniently? The 
circumstances suggest not. Why then did the Châtelet, on February 18th, 1790, sentence Favras to 
death for having formed, communicated to military officers, bankers and others, and attempted to 
implement a plan for counter-revolution in France which was to have been carried out by 
assembling the malcontents of several different provinces and laying siege to Paris? (Cormeré 3-
4; Shapiro 1993, 140). Favras had to die in order to maintain political stability and regain social 
control. 
First, Favras presented a political threat.  On or about February 16th, 1790 (that is to say, 
before Favras’s judgment), “[he] drafted a declaration in which he insisted that it was the [comte 
de Provence] who had enlisted him in the plot.  Moreover, the [comte de Provence] had only 
been able to entice him into participating, Favras stated, by convincing him that the queen was 
also involved” (Shapiro 1993, 130).  But Talon took the document—Favras’s last hope of 
avoiding the hangman’s noose—and destroyed it after convincing the marquis that it was 
unnecessary to drag another man to his depths.26  Favras could have spoken against the comte de 
Provence or his other accomplices during his four-hour speech prior to his execution, but he did 
not.  He understood that protecting the member of the royal family would provide political unity 
to the city of Paris.  L’abbaye Le Duc, son to Louis XV accompanied Favras up to the gallows 
and whispered a few last words: “You can do no more….you save the royal family...the fate of 
your family is assured…yours, glorious” (Cleray 109, quoting Mémoires of Thiébault). 
                                                
26 Much later Madame du Cayla, daughter of Favras, presented the then King Louis XVIII a 
letter.  The king replied by providing du Cayla with a small fortune and the castle of Saint-Ouen.  
Droz and Cleray believe this letter to be a copy of the declaration implicating the comte de 
Provence.  This theory has not yet been proven. 
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As for the people fueled by the national fanaticism and excited by exaggerations in 
multiple newspapers, they flocked around the Châtelet to see the criminal Favras face 
persecution.  The crowd of people, remarked Pithon de Valenville, hindered many journalists 
from approaching the Châtelet in order to cover the case.  According to Edmond Cleray, the 
masses cried for the death penalty and “did not stop howling from beneath the windows of the 
room where the judges sat” (Idem. 99-100).  On the day Favras was sentenced to “be hung and 
strangled until death follows,” masses of people crowded the courtroom and hued at the sight of 
Favras.  Qutremère, in a brief conversation with Favras on the morning of the 19th, understood 
the importance of these people: 
[To Favras] Sir, your life is a great sacrifice that you owe to public security and 
tranquility.  I have no other consolation to give you save for those offered by religion 
(Cleray 102). 
 
Since the months of May, Parisian masses devolved into restlessness.  The hunters of the 
conspirators were largely unsuccessful and their largest prey, the baron de Besenval, slipped 
from their grasp at the last moment.  Press propagated myths of counterrevolution and fed into 
the masses’ paranoia.  Tensions rose as anonymous pamphlets implicated the comte de Provence 
in crimes of high treason and people remembered the ruination of France by the king’s advisors.  
Favras’s death offered a release, an appeasement to the people’s thirst for revenge.  The same 
people that crowded the Châtelet surrounded the gallows before Notre Dame on February 19th, 
1790 and found a man clad in white, calm and resigned to his fate (Janinet 1790). 
AN HONORABLE MEMORY REPAIRED: MYTHOLOGY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Favras delivered his last defense and testament before becoming the first person to die for 
the crime of lèse-nation (Gaven 15; Favras 1790b). At the gallows, he read his judgment before 
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reading his last will.   He claimed his innocence in regard to the charge of lèse-nation but said he 
was guilty of one crime: devotion and love of the king (Favras 1790d, 9). Favras hanged for his 
support of the royalty as a young boy screamed “jump Marquis, jump!”  (Shapiro 1993, 169; 
Prieur, Berthault, and Duplessi-Bertaux 1790).  His death split the public’s reaction split between 
designating him as a traitor against the nation and honoring him as a martyr of the monarchy.   
Despite Cleray’s claim that “the case of Favras, however recent, barely left traces in the 
memory of Parisians,” many papers and prominent people covered the trial and execution from 
1789 to 2017 (Cleray 97).  Camille Desmoulins, among other revolutionaries, denounced Favras 
as the traitor he was found to be by the Châtelet.  He lamented the pity shown towards the 
marquis: 
When one recalls that the day-laborer Adrien, was judged and hanged in twenty-four 
hours for circulating a seditious flyer, although he did not know how to read, it is strange 
to see some people complain about the fate of Favras, who was convicted of a multitude 
of much more serious charges.  This shows how difficult it is to uproot certain aristocratic 
prejudices, such as the one which assigns a day-laborer and a marquis different weights 
on the scales of justice (Shapiro 1993, 106, quoting Révolutions de France et de Brabant 
no. 17).  
 
Other revolutionaries published images such as the Réception d’un marquis aux Enfers, which 
finds clear parallels in Lambesc’s Descent to Hell.  On the other hand, royalists complained of 
the short judicial procedure and, in a publication of correspondence between the marquis and 
marquise de Favras during their captivity, his direct descendants called his trial a “judicial 
assassination” and a “public calamity” (Favras and Favras 1790, forward by Mahy-Savonnière, a 
relative). 
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This split interpretation of the Favras continued throughout history as historians offered 
evidence in favor of one side or the other.27  The first major account of the trial came from the 
baron de Cormeré, brother to Favras. His work remained as the only historical document 
recounting the trial and historians naturally shied away from such a biased text.  Nevertheless, it 
should not be completely disregarded.  As counsel for the accused, the document provides ample 
evidence of a solid defense against all evidence used against Favras.  If nothing else, Cormeré 
successfully created a reasonable doubt of Favras’ guiltiness in the minds of his reader.  Alexis 
de Valon took a second look at the case in 1851 but cited only piece-meal instead of the official 
documents. Until recently, this archival material was presumed lost and likely burned in the fire 
of the archives of the Préfecture de police in 1871.  Valon, nevertheless, came to the conclusion 
that Favras should not have been found guilty because he was loyal to the king.  At a time of 
clear support for the monarchy, this comes without surprise.  Then, in 1932, Edmond Cleray 
found the case files and rewrote the riveting story of Favras, martyr to the monarchy and victim 
of judicial incompetence.  In 1993, Shapiro carried on this tradition of martyrdom but opened the 
doors for discussion of the impact of his execution. Gaven, published in 2016, most recently 
discussed Favras in a bigger work on all lèse-nation cases and comes to the conclusion that 
Favras acted in the interest of the king but not in the interest of the new government, weak and 
needing protection through ambiguous laws. 
 
Martyr or traitor, Favras remains the most memorable criminal of lèse-nation and a perfect 
example of failure to navigate the multiple courts.  Society, through the press, declared Favras an 
enemy of the nation worthy of a quick lynching for his treason.  Politically, Favras represented 
                                                
27 More work than those named have been produced on Favras.  This is a simple historiography 
representative of general trends towards considering Favras as a martyr, traitor, or victim. 
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an immediate and apparent threat to political stability of the constitutional monarchy if he ever 
chose to reveal the treasonous behavior of the comte de Provence.  Both social justice and 
political justice clamored for his death; the Châtelet relented despite an honest effort by Favras’ 
counsel.  But, instead of providing the socio-political unity necessary for Paris to survive the 
revolution, Favras’s execution deepened the divide between the left and the right, the 
revolutionaries and the royalists.  His fall guaranteed the continuation of the aristocracy and 
likely delayed civil war between the supporters of the royal family and revolutionaries, but his 
death was a stop-gap measure in the attempt to avoid complete collapse into chaos that would 
come to reign in 1791. Satisfying all of the proverbial courts does not guarantee a positive 
outcome.  
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CONCLUSION 
In advancing this theory of conflicting justices and battle among proverbial social, 
political, and judicial courts, this work served as a bridge between the social and political schools 
of thought surrounding the French Revolution.  While it is now unfavorable to hold on to a social 
explanation of the French Revolution, the research conducted by those historians nevertheless 
has a profound insight into the workings of the institutions of the time.  Equally, politics and 
power plays studied by revisionists have better explanatory powers in cases of political turmoil.  
To this division, I add that not everything that goes on in a courtroom can be explained through 
judicial procedure and the law, and that both schools of thought show that political and social 
pressures play a prominent, if not deciding, role.  This study in particular demonstrates the 
sensitivity of some groups to these extrajudicial pressures, the ways judicial objectivity can sway 
to these pressures, and the effects of these pressures on the cases of lèse-nation.   
The nobility under the Old Regime were sensitive to political and social pressures 
because of their historical roles as models and possessors of power. Though fundamental to this 
discussion of criminal proceedings during the early French Revolution, this argument is likely 
the most vulnerable.  Works by Chaussinand-Nogaret and other revisionists have shown that not 
all elites were nobles nor did most fit the mold of rich, powerful men committed to service of the 
king.  But, to critics of this forced conflation between elites and the nobility, it must be said that 
no argument was made in defense of the typical picture of the nobility.  Instead, it has been 
shown that people in 1789 (and for about two centuries afterwards) believed in an ideal-type of 
living nobly that clouded their perception of the nobility and blurred the lines between nobles 
and political elites.  Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras, as publicly recognizable nobles were thus 
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subject to social and political pressure of both identities and exemplary of the treatment of this 
ideal by the courts of Paris in 1789.   
In terms of social justice, Lambesc, Besenval, and Favras were all subject to the whims of 
the masses and the disdain of the people.  The general aristocratic conspiracy began as a social 
phenomenon with judicial consequences.  Condescension, disparagement, and calls for punitive 
“popular” justice echoed throughout the derogatory pamphlets against Lambesc, the responses of 
the press to Besenval’s trials and de Sèze arguments, and the demonstrators clamoring outside 
Favras’s cell at the Châtelet prison or at his hanging.  Revolution predicated on the power of the 
average person personified in the fiction of a unified nation gives commanding influence to the 
masses.  The majority gained a voice and they used it to define the values of the New Regime.  
Majority rule founds its only limits in the existing institutions such as the Châtelet that protected 
minority (criminal) rights. When these institutions fell in 1792, a derivative justice—mob rule— 
began its dominion.  
But before, political justice under the Lafayettist coalition served to both legitimize the 
new regime and find a relative stability compared to the threatened anarchy of the revolution.  
While this can most obviously be seen in the political connections of Favras to Monsieur, the 
comte de Provence, Besenval had ties to elites such as Necker, and Lambesc, whose ties to 
politicians have not been conclusively established due to a heavy reliance on military history, 
nevertheless had foreign associates in Austria.  When these political networks severed (Favras) 
or succumbed to popular outrage (Besenval), criminals were subject to more intense judicial 
scrutiny leading to guilty verdicts and failed attempts at complete amnesty.  On the other hand, 
Lambesc successfully retreated to Vienna and profited from political protection from 
prosecution.  Politics can both mitigate and exacerbate the drive to accuse, indict, and condemn.  
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Meanwhile, judicial justice and the law are the results of political goals, popular 
demands, and political concessions.  During the French Revolution, a new vision of justice based 
on equality before the law and accountability reflected novel understandings of inter-class (both 
political and social) relationships.  Courts held the military responsible for the damages they 
unjustifiably caused to property and people but recognized the legitimate need to main the statu 
quo of officer subordination and obedience.  Instead of serving as a proto-Terror institution as 
some have claimed, the Châtelet served as the balancing mechanism between all of the various 
justices, individual rights, and societal needs.  This phenomenon can be seen through decisions 
such as the Favras-Besenval transaction.   
Together, theses three justices combine to nuance the currently accepted notion of 
revolutionary justice.  Previously seen as ruthless, terror-driven, and bloodthirsty, actual 
revolutionary justice depends on a combination of factors including society, politics, and 
institutional constraint.  Any one justice could prevail and dominate; such was the case of the 
Terror.  But then the question becomes how that particular pressure dominated over other 
influences.  This same approach can be applied to other revolutions such as the American 
Revolution of 1776, Russian Revolutions of 1917, and the Arab Spring of 2010 to 2012.  
Historians need to address the role of the courts during periods of revolution or extreme cultural 
and political change.  This study serves as an example of the multivariate approach to the courts 
needed for a holistic and complete interpretation of revolutionary justice that current academia 
seeks.   
 
     History never repeats itself.  Man always does. – Voltaire 
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